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Introduction
Upon his inauguration in January 2021, President Joseph Biden inherited a collection of maximum
pressure campaigns from his predecessor. After a year-long international health crisis, activists
and members of the press are calling on the new Administration to end the economic warfare that
characterized U.S. relations with its adversaries for the last four years. The Administration of
President Donald Trump imposed those policies ostensibly to alter the behavior and politics of
adversarial states. The case of Venezuela is emblematic; the Trump Administration implemented
strict sanctions against the country’s oil industry for two years in an unsuccessful effort to oust
President Nicolás Maduro. This raises an important question: Under which conditions can
sanctions succeed in achieving U.S. objectives?
With respect to that guiding question, the research for this paper reveals several
implications for future sanctions policy and scholarship. First, sanctions must exacerbate threats
to the status quo political order of the sanctioned state (i.e., the target). However, such threats are
not sufficient for a successful outcome. The sender of sanctions (i.e., the sender) must capitalize
on the costs that sanctions impose by signaling a viable path toward sanctions relief for relevant
power brokers within the target state. Additionally, the sender must be prepared to compromise on
the scope of its policy goals. An unwillingness to negotiate over the terms of sanctions relief risks
pushing the target to pursue a policy of resistance rather than compliance. Third-party support for
the target further raises that risk. To increase the likelihood of sanctions success and encourage the
target to pursue compliance, the sender should maintain a demonstrable and proactive plan for
sanctions relief which would function as a positive incentive during negotiations between the target
and sender. Finally, the sender must be sensitive to the humanitarian concerns of a maximum
pressure campaign. Ultimately, the sender must pursue a policy of optimization, rather than
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hardline approach. Future U.S. Administrations will cause undue harm to civilian populations if
they cannot structure sanctions policies that respond to the situation at hand and present a clear
path toward sanctions relief.
This paper arrives at those policy implications through a comparison of two case studies:
the aforementioned case of failure in Venezuela and the case of sanctions success in Iran in the
leadup to the 2015 nuclear deal. This paper turns to these two cases due to key similarities between
the sanctions episodes. First, both Venezuela and Iran are heavily dependent on oil exports, and
U.S. sanctions targeted the oil sector in both cases. Furthermore, in both cases the U.S. resorted to
secondary sanctions against third parties, which intensified the overall effects of sanctions. Finally,
U.S.-Venezuelan and U.S.-Iranian relations were both adversarial at the time of sanctions, which
limited the prospects of U.S. diplomatic efforts. Ideally, these common features between the case
studies would serve to limit confounding variables in explaining sanctions outcomes. The
discussion section addresses relevant differences between the cases that the research for this paper
discovered. Ultimately, a comparison of the two cases reveals valuable implications for intense
sanctions policies or maximum pressure campaigns.
This research is vital as there is reason to believe that the U.S. will continue to lean into
economic coercion as opposed to traditional military engagement. Decades in the Middle East
have left the American public exhausted and hesitant to send U.S. troops abroad. President
Trump’s message of retrenchment resonated with voters, and although he is no longer in office,
his successor seems just as determined to pull out of costly military endeavors—case in point,
Afghanistan. It is tough to tell how long this mood will hold sway over the U.S., but in the
meantime, administrations will rely on alternative policy instruments: namely, economic
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sanctions. Scholars must devote their efforts to finding ways that the U.S. can wield weapons of
economic coercion responsibly.
To use sanctions responsibly is to implement policy that mitigates and minimizes the
humanitarian and economic costs to the target and sender populations. This is especially relevant
today as the director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, Benn Steil,
cites intense sanctions use as the largest threat to the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s preeminent
currency (O’Connor 2021). Furthermore, recent studies suggest that sanctions impose significant
costs on U.S. firms that engage with sanctioned entities or within sanctioned states (Allen 2021,
1; Webb 2020, 749). Critics of U.S. sanctions policy also note the humanitarian costs imposed on
the target population—this includes hindering access to food and medicine (Beinart 2021). One
study revealed a particularly damning pattern: U.S. participation in sanctions efforts leads to more
corrosive effects on the public health conditions of the target state (Peksen 2011, 248). Another
study found that U.S. sanctions tend to lead to diminished respect for civil liberties by the target
government (Antonis and Tsarsitalidou 2019, 208). These concerns demonstrate the necessity of
sanctions policy that is informed by conditions within the target state and updated accordingly.
This paper proceeds with a review of the relevant literature on assessing sanctions
outcomes. Following that section is a description of three frameworks through which the case
studies will analyze sanctions implementation and outcomes. Then there are the two case studies
on Venezuela and Iran followed by a comparative assessment of the three frameworks. Finally,
there is a discussion section which offers a comparison of the two case studies, five policy
implications, and concluding remarks on the different explanations for sanctions outcomes.
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Literature Review
Academics and policy makers alike have long debated the merits and drawbacks of economic
sanctions. Advocates argue that under sufficient conditions, sanctions are a useful tool in any
state’s foreign policy wheelhouse—somewhere between the extremes of doing nothing and
military intervention. There is a bit more variety among detracting viewpoints. Some contend that
the costs to human security within the target state (the state that receives sanctions) are too high to
justify the use of sanctions, whereas others point out all the instances when sanctions have not
worked to achieve the goals of the sender state (the state that employs sanctions). Whether in favor
of or against the use of sanctions, research indicates that they fail more often than not, just as in
the Venezuelan case covered later in this paper (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 127). To prepare for that
discussion, this section reviews the relevant literature regarding the question, why do sanctions
fail?
There are three general approaches to investigating that question: target centric
explanations, third party centric explanations, and sender centric explanations. Target centric
explanations look at ways the that target adapt to sanctions—the primary concern is how target’s
response to sanctions affects the outcome of the sanctions episode. Third party centric explanations
examine how targets are able to evade sanctions by pursuing trade or aid from actors outside of
the target-sender relationship. Sender centric explanations focus on how senders implement and
enforce sanctions—and where they go wrong. Below is a discussion of each of these three
approaches. Additionally, this section includes a review of the relevant debate over targeted
sanctions—those aimed at specific individuals, groups, or firms.
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Target Centric Explanations: Adaptation
Scholars that turn to adaptation explanations for the failure of sanctions often point to the faulty
logic the policy makers use when implementing sanctions. Galtung explains this line of reasoning
as the Naïve Theory of Economic Warfare—the idea that economic sanctions result in valuedeprivation (e.g., lower quality of life, reduced private benefits, etc.) and eventually reach a
maximum point at which political disintegration occurs (1967, 388-9). Galtung explains that in
reality sanctions do not work that way because the Naïve Theory does not take adaptation into
account. Beyond that basic premise there is considerable divergence of opinion on what adaptation
actually entails. Whereas Galtung favors a psychological explanation whereby the general
population of the target learns to live below a previous standard, others like Sylvan argue that
adaptation is the “flexibility” of the target government’s political base—their ability to find new
ways to maintain their economic interests (389-90; 1983, 236).
Some experts center their theories on the target government itself rather than the general
population of the target. Wallensteen, looking at ten prominent cases of sanctions use from the 20th
Century, concludes that a weak target government and a strong opposition party or coalition are
necessary for the success of sanctions. In the absence of those conditions, the target government
will turn to adaptive policies rather than abstaining from whatever behavior triggered the sanctions
(1983, 125-6). One critique of Wallensteen’s assessment is his understanding of “opposition.”
While he does not define the term, he equates a weak target government to a strong opposition and
vice versa. This understanding excludes the possibility of a strong target government (i.e., wellentrenched in power) that must answer to influential internal groups and individuals. Under those
conditions, it is possible that sanctions could alter the behavior of the incumbent by harming the
interests of actors within the ruling coalition who would pressure the incumbent to pursue
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sanctions relief. Therefore, a strong political opposition in the conventional sense would not be
necessary.
In a similar vein, Preeg contends that whether a target government complies with the
demands of the sender is dependent on the target government’s cost analysis of compliance versus
sanctions. This, Preeg claims, explains why it is difficult for senders to achieve democratization
within the target state—the cost of abdicating power (or at least allowing for that possibility) is
exceptionally high relative to even the most severe forms of sanctions. The decades long U.S.
embargo on Cuba supports Preeg’s assessment (1999, 201-2). While the calculations of the
incumbent are doubtlessly important, the cost analysis of other political actors may be just as
significant. Similar to the example in the preceding paragraph, if a faction within the ruling
coalition perceives the costs of sanctions as greater than the benefits of the status quo political
situation, they may seek a change in leadership. This is to say, scholars must be careful not to
consider the target government a unitary actor. Even within autocratic political systems, sanctions
might be used to exploit existing divisions and competing interests.
Contemporary research on the question of adaptation synthesizes the target government
and target population views. Scholars look at which individuals are affected by sanctions and then
analyze how those individuals interact with the target government. Lektzian and Souva study the
political institutions of the target as their independent variable on the success of sanctions. The
authors stake their explanation on the size of the target government’s winning coalition—the
individuals or population that a government relies on to maintain power. Within a non-democracy,
the winning coalition is generally smaller so broad economic sanctions no matter how intense will
not jeopardize the government’s power (2007, 849). According to this theory, sanctions fail when
they do not generate sufficient costs for the winning coalition. Lektzian and Patterson further
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develop the political-institutional explanation by examining the mechanism by which sanctions
actually generate costs for a winning coalition (2015, 47). The duo found that producing costs
within the winning coalition is dependent on harming the relative wealth of those coalition
members who own or use prominent factors of production in the target state (57).
One further area of consideration for adaptation to sanctions is counteractive effects of the
sanctions themselves that help to foster adaptation. Galtung proposes the idea that sanctions can
initially lead to political integration, or unified resistance to sanctions within the target population.
He notes that this is most likely to occur in cases where the sanctions affect the population broadly,
there is little to no identification with the sender, and there is a feeling that no alternatives to living
with the sanctions exist (e.g., supporting an opposition party) (1967, 389-90). Jones, in his analysis
of the sanctions against South Africa, Myanmar, and Iraq, found that the socio-political dynamics
within a country weigh heavily on the outcomes of those sanctions (2015, 182). He is largely in
agreement with Wallensteen concerning the importance of a strong opposition but takes the
argument one step further by pointing out that sanctions further weaken fragmented oppositions
(178). That idea ties into one of Preeg’s findings that dissidents within target states do not always
support sanctions since they jeopardize private sector engagement from the sender state (1999,
202-3). Finally, Lektzian and Souva found that sanctions can increase the relative power of nondemocratic target governments by building loyalty and wealth through smuggling and illicit
markets (2007, 853-4).
The primary draw of the target centric approach is the fact that it gives a glimpse into the
internal mechanisms of the target state. Since sanctions are a tool of foreign policy, it can be
tempting to focus on states as unitary institutions, but that approach fails to acknowledge important
variables like regime type, winning coalition size, and strength of domestic opposition. Lektzian
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and Souva’s use of Selectorate Theory—the idea that government behavior is primarily determined
by the size of the winning coalition—is especially compelling given its parsimonious appeal
(2007). To assess a sanctions episode, one need only examine how the sanctions affect the winning
coalition in the target state. This approach is also integral in understanding the common finding
that democracies are more likely to comply with the sender than are autocracies—smaller winning
coalitions are better able to adapt to sanctions.
One drawback of this approach, however, is the fact that it is difficult to translate findings
into useful policy recommendations—at least compared with a sender centric approach. This is
not to say that such results are useless, but by focusing on variables that are almost entirely out of
the sender’s control, scholars limit the utility of their results. Additionally, this approach
downplays the role of external actors, perhaps to an excessive degree. Preeg cites the costs of
democratization as preventing an autocratic target from complying yet does not explore the role of
politically motivated third-party actors who undermine sanctions (1999). It could be the case that
the political structure of the target is largely irrelevant if there is sufficient trade and aid available
to the target. Finally, this approach may be difficult to employ in instances when the sender
implements targeted sanctions. With comprehensive sanctions it is much easier to make educated
assumptions concerning the economic impact of sanctions, whereas targeted sanctions may require
more detailed information on how sanctions affected individuals and firms—data that scholars
may not readily be able to access in the sanctions episodes that involve adversarial or autocratic
targets.
Third Party Centric Explanations: Evasion
Scholars that write on the role that evasion plays in the failure of sanctions typically do not reject
the findings and theories of alternative explanations; however, they are skeptical of the emphasis
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on internal factors (i.e., target adaptation) rather than external factors. Green notes as much in his
critique of Galtung’s emphasis on the target state’s population (1983, 63-4). He agrees that the
political and economic situations within the target are important, but the target government must
account for material needs before working on adaptive measures—this necessitates turning to a
third-party state to evade sanctions (81-2). Hufbauer et al., in their well-known analysis of over
100 instances of sanctions use, determine that these third parties indeed have a statistically
significant effect on the success or failure of sanctions (1990, 97). They even gave a name to third
party states that undermine sanctions for political or economic purposes: black knights (97).
A more recent edition of the Hufbauer et al. study found that black knights are not as
common in the post-Cold War era given the decline in great power rivalry, the idea being that
black knights are primarily politically motivated (2007, 47). McLean and Whang reach a similar
conclusion, finding that the failure of sanctions is not correlated with the prevalence of black
knights (2010, 439). However, they did determine that the commercial relationship between the
target and its primary trade partner post-sanctions implementation has a significant bearing on the
success of sanctions—especially so, if the primary trade partner is the sender (439). Building off
the apparent role of commercial ties in the outcome of sanctions, Lektzian and Biglaiser found that
as US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) left the target state upon the implementation of sanctions
(the US being the sender) FDI from third parties replaced it (2013, 71). This pattern held for
authoritarian regimes (75). These studies raise an important debate, how important are third-party
states in evading sanctions? Are targets able to accomplish evasion through the private sector
alone?
The most prolific writer on the topic of black knights and sanctions-busters, Bryan Early,
argues no, third party states still play a fundamental role even if the avenues through which they

10
operate are in the private sector. Early noticed that black knights are often noted in specific case
studies, but prior to his 2011 study there was no general study on the effect of black knights (382).
(For instance, they are merely one of many variables examined in Hufbauer et al. 2007 and a
secondary variable in McLean and Whang 2010). Early found that black knights do in fact increase
the likelihood of sanctions failing when aid to the target is accompanied by commercial interaction
(396). He further develops his theory to include two types of “sanctions-busting” (his term for
evading sanctions): aid-based—motivated by political salience of the issue at hand—and tradebased—motivated by commercial interests (2020, 207). His study confirms that both forms of
sanctions-busting jeopardize the success of sanctions. More surprisingly, he found that allies of
the sender are at extreme risk of becoming trade-based sanctions-busters because senders are less
likely to compel allies to respect sanctions (210-1). These findings are important for understanding
sanctions outcomes, but Early does not provide any figures or predictions as to how much trade or
aid-based support a target must receive to evade sanctions. Due to the variance between sanctions
episodes this would be difficult; however, one possibility is to compare the value of aid and tradebased support to targets’ GDP. Identifying some sort of critical point would considerably
strengthen Early’s theory.
Early’s finding concerning allies relates to a similar line of research that looks into the
effects of back-sliding, or when a sender within a multilateral effort reneges by either revoking its
support of the sanctions or ceasing any substantial attempt to enforce sanctions. Debate within the
literature focuses on the degree to which international cooperation is necessary for success. Some
scholars argue that it is dependent on the situation (O’Sullivan 2003, 290-1; Hufbauer et al. 2007,
172-3), whereas others view it more or less as a requirement (Doxey 1996, 115; Martin 1993, 408).
Drezner made the important discovery that backsliding can be quite detrimental to multilateral
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sanctions and that states are more likely to backout of sanctions agreements in the absence of
oversight by an international organization (2000, 97-8). A more detailed discussion of multilateral
versus unilateral sanction will follow in the next section; here, the important take-away is that
backsliding can function in the same way as black knights or sanctions-busters—allowing a target
to evade sanctions.
The third-party centric approach addresses one of the primary concerns of the previous
approach by acknowledging what one might call the elephant in the room of sanctions episodes:
external actors. This is especially so in the midst of globalization and the blurring of private and
public engagement among states. Lektzian and Biglaiser’s research into third-party FDI rightfully
elevates the importance of private markets in undermining sanctions (2013). Even Early, who
focuses his analysis on states, contends that commercial engagement plays a significant part in
reducing the economic impact of sanctions (2011). That focus on international trade and aid also
allows scholars to collect more uniform and reliable data to assess their theories—again, in contrast
to the target centric approach in which access to evidence varies by case.
This approach does suffer from the same lack of utility for policy makers as the target
centric explanations. The findings from third-party explanations are certainly useful to senders but
focusing on elements outside of the sender’s control introduces a barrier to streamlined policy
recommendations. Another potential issue with this approach is ambiguity in the direction of
causality between the failure of sanctions and sanctions busters. Early attributes failure to the
sanctions-busters (2020), but it could be the case that a failure of sanctions—for some other
reason—prompts third party actors to engage in trade with the target after observing a seemingly
futile sanctions episode. Direction of causality likely varies across cases, but the point stands that
sanctions busters may not be the decisive variable in determining the outcome of sanctions.
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Finally, third party centric explanations obviously lack value in cases of failure that do not include
prominent occurrences of third-party activity, limiting the number of cases when scholars can
employ this approach.
Sender Centric Explanations: Implementation and Enforcement
Scholars that turn to sender centric explanations often do so with policy implications in mind.
Therefore, their work tends to be more prescriptive in nature to help improve the utility of
sanctions. They argue that when sanctions fail, the issue is not the tool (the sanctions), but rather
how the tool is used. Debate over sender centric explanations tends to revolve around what should
and should not be included in a sanctions regime. There is not a general framework for why
sanctions fail within the literature concerning sender centric explanations—the way one might
consider adaptation the general framework for target centric explanations. Determining why
sanctions fail from the sender perspective requires a review of what contributes to successful
sanctions implementation, and then using that information to surmise how sanctions fail in the
absence of such conditions. For example, the literature is in agreement that sanctions are most
effective when implemented swiftly to prevent the target from adapting to the sanctions (Haass
1998, 208-9; Hufbauer et al. 2007, 168). This means that drawn-out or incremental sanctions
episodes are a contributing factor to failure—one that senders have considerable control over. One
issue that these scholars neglect is how concurrent sanctions against the same target affect
outcomes of sanctions episodes. In both the cases in this paper, sanctions were in place prior to the
episode in question, which raises the question whether the earlier sanctions should be included in
assessing the timespan of a sanctions episode.
While scholars agree that swift sanctions are preferable, an issue that sparks debate is
whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are optimal. Doxey places significant weight on the
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role of cooperation, and Haass goes as far to say that multilateral support should be a prerequisite
to implementation (1996, 115; 1998, 206-7). What distinguishes the work within the sender centric
from third party centric school of thought, is that scholars within the sender centric school look at
the effects of states’ efforts to garner cooperation. Haass notes that secondary sanctions—imposed
on third parties that undermine sanctions—should be avoided due to significant economic and
diplomatic costs (207). Hufbauer et al. note that how multilateral sanctions come about is a greater
consideration than cooperation itself; a sender must be mindful of which states and how many to
include in its coalition (2007, 172-3). O’Sullivan views cooperation as helpful in many cases, but
by no means universally necessary. She explains that the necessity of multilateral support is
determined by the goals of the sender. If the goal is to contain the target (i.e., limit its external
behavior) then the sender ought to seek support from the UN Security Council (2003, 288-91).
This all entails that the effect of cooperation or lack thereof is largely dependent on the case—
specifically, how the sender built its sanctions coalition. Furthermore, the UN Security Council is
an invaluable tool in imposing multilateral measures.
Within the literature there is a general consensus that the success of sanctions is dependent
on concurrent policies of the sender state toward the target. Doxey writes that sanctions certainly
have their place in a broader strategy, “but [are] not usually decisive” (1996, 124). As O’sullivan
puts it, sanctions should be a mere policy instrument within a larger strategy (2003, 287-8). Haass
supports this idea, citing the threat or use of military force as the primary example of
complimentary policy (1998, 198-9). Hufbauer et al. highlight the utility of incentives when paired
with sanctions. These “carrots” work by lowering the costs of compliance on the part of the target
(2007, 169). O’Sullivan describes a process of reciprocity that allows for a gradual reduction in
sanctions as the target takes steps change its behavior (2003, 288). Other concurrent policies are
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dependent on the goals of the sanctions—for regime change, support of the opposition is vital
(291). Furthermore, senders aiming to alter the domestic political situation of a target must monitor
whether economic pressure is translating into political costs (306-7). The literature here indicates
that failure of sanctions is in large part a result of the failure of other policies—or even the failure
to implement other policies.
Sender centric explanations are the best suited for informing policy makers, given that
these explanations directly address the ways in which sanctions fall short of achieving the goals of
the sender. If policy makers head the advice of scholars of this approach, not only could sanctions
improve, but also recent research into targeted sanctions could help to reduce humanitarian
externalities. While this may be quixotic thinking, it is more likely that such improvements in
policy would come from this approach than from the previous two that do not provide an analysis
of sender behavior. One final advantage for this approach is access to information on the sender
state and sanctions policy—at least for U.S. based research in cases when the U.S. is the sender.
While there are still limits to evidence gathering (e.g., internal debate among policy elites),
scholars benefit gathering data on their own government—no language barriers, higher
transparency, personal ties to sender government etc.
For all the benefits of this approach, it runs into the issue of having the narrowest scope of
the three approaches: whatever the sender government has control over. The target centric
approach is narrow, but still includes elements outside the target government like the strength of
political opposition. This creates a cap on the explanatory utility of the sender centric approach
because even a flawless policy can fail for reasons outside the sender’s control. Another issue with
this approach is that it does not easily lend itself to developing a general theory on sanctions failure.
After any instance of failure, it is easy for scholars to fault a particular element of the sanctions
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policy. This could lead to a dangerous assumption that failure always is due to poor execution or
planning and, therefore, requires improvement rather than abandoning sanctions for a different
tool. O’Sullivan seems to fall in this category, overemphasizing the utility of sanctions. She gives
recommendations for using sanctions to achieve lofty goals like regime change (2003, 290-1),
whereas a scholar from another approach may argue sanctions are not appropriate for those sorts
of goals.
A Note on Targeted Sanctions
Recent research into the use of sanctions often focuses on targeted sanctions, sanctions that are
intended to affect individual policy makers and groups within the target state without the same
humanitarian impact as comprehensive trade sanctions (Gordon 2011, 315). Similar to research on
comprehensive sanctions, scholars use the three approaches detailed above. In fact, many of the
more recent articles this review covered were studies involving instances of targeted sanctions.
Targeted sanctions have become the status quo sanctions policy for the both the UN and United
States. Despite this fact—or maybe because of it—debate over the use of targeted sanctions
continues among scholars. The debate is relevant to this paper as it introduces an additional metric
to gage success: humanitarian externalities. Gordon points out in her 2011 review of targeted
sanctions that they arose out of concern that broader trade sanctions negatively impacted civilians
of the target state to an excessive degree—specifically sanctions against Iraq in the early 1990s
(316-8). Therefore, if a sender implements targeted sanctions, limiting negative externalities in the
target state is at least a secondary goal to compliance from the target government.
The success of targeted sanctions has varied on both the compliance and humanitarian
fronts. Gordon points out the difficulty of enforcement for senders and ease of evasion for targets
(2011, 326-8). Lopez—one of the original architects of targeted sanctions policy—refutes
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Gordon’s assessment by demonstrating that smart sanctions have worked in eight of twelve cases
that the UN Security Council used them in between 2005 and 2011 (2012, 138-41). Furthermore,
they can be especially useful in limiting the movement and behavior of dictators (144-5). Drezner’s
assessment of research on financial sanctions (targeted sanctions that limit access to an individual’s
assets) reveals that they may be the most promising variant of targeted sanctions (2015, 758).
As for humanitarian concerns, research indicates that broader sanctions lead to greater
human rights violations in the target state, and financial sanctions can limit such issues (Peksen
2009, 74; Shagabutdinova and Berejikian 2007, 68-9). Yet, as Gordon highlights, the humanitarian
impact of targeted sanctions is still present—especially when senders target a prominent industry
(2011, 326). Another issue that Gordon points out is the fact that senders do not adequately monitor
the humanitarian impact of targeted sanctions but merely rest on the assumption that opting for
financial sanctions as opposed to broader measures is sufficient to limit negative externalities
(2015, 872). While this paper is primarily concerned with issues of compliance, the discussion
section incorporates the issue of humanitarian costs of sanctions.
Alternative Explanations
Whether centered on the behavior of the target, a third party, or the sender, literature on sanctions
does not typically exclude explanations of a certain type, but rather emphasize the utility that an
approach has over others. This paper, which seeks to explain why sanctions failed to oust President
Maduro of Venezuela and succeeded in compelling Iran to accept the 2015 nuclear deal, assesses
the relative merits of the three general approaches explained in the preceding section. This section
describes three alternative explanations for sanctions failure in abstract terms based on the three
approaches from the literature. The sections for each alternative include an explanation of relevant

17
indicators that the case studies use to assess and compare the alternative hypotheses later in this
paper.
Adaptation
This explanation ascribes the failure of sanctions to the internal reaction of the target state (i.e.,
adaptation). Adaptation implies the failure of sanctions in spite of economic costs to the target. So,
adaptation prevents economic costs from translating into political costs—an all but certain
outcome according to the Naïve Theory of Economic Warfare (Galtung 1967, 388). The literature
confirms the theory’s namesake as target states can find ways to push economic costs to individuals
outside the government’s winning coalition. Therefore, this explanation posits that sanctions fail
due to the target government’s continued ability to satisfy its winning coalition and maintain the
status quo balance of power in relation to domestic opposition groups.
Adaptation Hypothesis: if sanctions impose economic costs on the target, but the
target government is able to prevent those costs from triggering political costs then
the sanctions are unlikely to succeed.
This study employs three indicators to assess the adaptation explanation. First, for this explanation
to have any utility, there must be significant economic costs for the target as a result of sanctions.
Without economic costs, there would be no need to adapt and therefore an explanation that focuses
on external factors would be more apt. To determine the severity of economic costs to the target
the case studies cover changes in conventional metrics used to assess economic performance from
before and after the implementation of sanctions. The case studies also cover specific industry
indicators depending on the target state in question—for instance, the oil sector in the case of
Venezuela. Finally, the case studies include secondary source assessments of the impact of
sanctions should any exist for the case at hand.
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The second indicator this study uses to assess the adaptation explanation is the presence of
institutions and government structures that facilitate adaptation. Pulling from Lektzian and
Souva’s use of Selectorate Theory, adaptative institutions and structures are those that ensure the
winning coalition remains satisfied, which keeps the incumbent in power (2007, 849). This entails
assessing the make-up of the target government—what is the regime type, how much power does
the head-of-state have, what role does the military play, what sectors of society seem to have undue
influence over politics, etc. In addition to the presence of these adaptive factors, the case studies
address any evidence that these factors were indeed at play in preventing economic political costs.
Evidence may be sparse, but examples include high military expenditures, government
complacency despite intense public unrest, or the behavior of prominent private figures (e.g.,
remaining in the country despite heavy sanctions in their industry).
The third indicator the case studies use in assessing the adaptation explanation is the makeup and relative power of opposition groups within the target state or government. As Jones
indicates, without a strong opposition to apply political pressure to the target government, it is
unlikely that sanctions can produce political costs (2015, 182). In the case of adaptation, a weak
or fractured opposition would support this explanation. To assess the strength of the opposition,
the case studies detail the structure and make-up of any opposition—assuming there is an
opposition—to identify any weaknesses. For instance, rival opposition leaders would indicate
weakness through a lack of cohesion. Another variable to gauge the strength of the opposition is
whether the opposition accomplished anything around the time that the sanctions were imposed
like an impressive showing in local elections.
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Evasion
In contrast to adaptation, this explanation cites the undermining behavior of third parties as the
reason for the failure of sanctions. Third parties allow the target to evade sanctions and limit the
economic costs they are intended to impose. As Early notes, sanctions-busting can come in two
forms: trade-based or aid-based—though they are not mutually exclusive (2020, 207). Whether a
black knight, private actor, or criminal organization, economic interaction with the target will limit
the impact of sanctions. The degree to which third parties limit the impact determines the outcome
of the sanctions episode. Therefore, this explanation argues that sanctions fail because of third
party efforts to mitigate the economic costs to the target state, which prevents serious political
costs and compliance.
Evasion Hypothesis: if third party actors are able to mitigate the economic and
political costs of sanctions for the target government then sanctions are likely to
fail.
As with the previous explanation, the study uses three different indicators to assess the relative
merit of this explanation. The first, however obvious, is of vital importance: the presence of thirdparty sanction-busters. While their presence alone is not sufficient to explain failure of sanctions,
there must be identifiable actors for the evasion explanation to hold water. Examples include black
knights, as described in the literature (Hubauer et al. 1990, 97; Early 2011, 382) drug-trafficking
organizations, or private firms. The case studies examine various actors and refer to primary and
secondary sources to determine if third parties have undermined sanctions. Undermining sanctions
includes behavior that does not technically violate the language of the sanctions—for instance,
crude oil for petroleum deals to by-pass a ban on purchasing a target’s oil.
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If third parties are indeed involved in undermining sanctions, the second indicator
necessary in assessing the evasion explanation is the manner and intensity of trade or aid-based
sanction-busting. This first requires an assessment of how much trade or aid distribution occurred
between the third parties and target. The case studies refer to available evidence such as exports in
sanctioned goods, secondary sources documenting sanctions violations, and accounts of illicit
economic activity (e.g., drug trafficking, smuggling, etc.). To determine whether the behavior of
third parties actually had an effect the case studies also assess the target’s economy before and
after sanctions, with special attention given to key industries in the target economy (e.g., oil). A
weak impact of sanctions on the economy or a quick recovery would indicate that the third parties
contributed to limiting economic costs.
The final indicator this study uses to assess the evasion explanation is non-economic
behavior of third parties. This primarily applies to situations when the third party is a black knight
state with political motivations. Early finds that commercial engagement must be present for black
knights to have a bearing on the outcome of a sanctions episode (2011, 396), but to exclude noneconomic support of the target would preclude important factors like diplomacy and armed
support. Instances of non-economic support are hard to measure, but the case studies discuss any
potential impact they have on the target state. Examples include vetoing a sanctions regime in the
United Nations (UN) Security Council or sending security detail to protect the target government.
Implementation and Enforcement
The final explanation in this study attributes the failure of sanctions to the manner that the sender
implements and enforces sanctions. The literature indicates that sanctions are an inconsistent tool
to say the least; poor planning and execution on the part of the sender can give the target time to
adjust to sanctions economically or politically. O’Sullivan argues that sanctions can work, but only
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if they are structured for the specific case at hand and fall within a larger strategy (2003, 287-8).
This explanation argues that weak sanctions policy and insufficient support with other policy
measures on the part of the sender reduces the economic impact of sanctions and fails to create the
political incentives necessary in achieving compliance from the target government—entailing
failure of the sanctions episode.
Implementation and Enforcement Hypothesis: if the sender fails to impose
economic costs or pursue other mechanisms that incentivize compliance with the
sender’s demands then sanctions are likely to fail.
As with the previous alternative explanations, the case studies utilize three indicators to assess the
implementation and enforcement explanation. The first indicator is the presence of multilateral
support and the manner in which the sender attained support. A lack of organizational support or
implementation of secondary sanctions are problematic for sanctions outcomes (Drezner 2000, 978; Hufbauer et al. 2007, 172-3). In the case studies, a simple examination of the facts of the
sanctions episode should reveal the level and manner of international cooperation. In conjuncture
with information on the target economy, the case studies explore how the nature of the multilateral
support—or lack thereof—hindered the impact of sanctions.
The second indicator is the sender’s use of concurrent policies in translating the economic
burden imposed on the target into compliance on the part of the target government. There is
considerable consensus in the literature that complementary policy instruments are integral to the
success of sanctions (Haass 1998, 198; O’Sullivan 2003, 287-8; Hufbauer et al. 2007, 1169). This
can come in the form of positive economic incentives, the threat of military intervention, or
diplomatic engagement. The case studies identify the prevalence of such polices, and further
scrutinize the individual policies. Different factors that would indicate insufficient concurrent
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polices include a lack of non-economic policy, excessively stubborn negotiation tactics, or the
absence of diplomatic avenues for the target to communicate with the sender.
The final indicator in assessing this explanation is the timing of sanctions. This is one of
the few variables that the sender has nearly entire control over, and therefore could be very
indicative of the utility of the sender-oriented explanation. The literature finds that sanctions must
“slam the hammer, [not] turn the screw” (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 168). Therefore, the case studies
examine the timescale in which the sender implemented sanctions to determine whether
implementation was sudden or incremental. In addition, the cases consider any sanctions
implemented prior to the episode in question, as those sanctions could have reduced the overall
shock that the later sanctions caused. The case studies will also compare the economic impact of
the sanctions with the timing of sanctions to confirm whether timing was problematic—sudden
implementation with little economic impact would indicate that the sender’s timing was not the
reason for failure.
Sanctions Against Venezuela: 2019 – 2021
The U.S. and Venezuela have had strained relations for two decades since the dramatic political
revolution that brought former President Hugo Chávez to power. The late politician was known
for his charisma and ability to mobilize large parts of the electorate—primarily lower-class sectors
of society that felt ignored by previous administrations. Beginning with a new constitution in 1999,
Chávez ushered in a populist-socialist political system known as chavismo. Chavismo used oil
revenues—the state’s primary export—to supply patronage networks. These networks served to
build popular support within the majoritarian system that the Constitution of 1999 institutionalized
(Kornblith 2013, 48). Chávez used the apparent legitimacy of popular elections to centralize his
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power until his death in 2013 (53). His successor, then Vice President Nicolás Maduro, won a
questionable special election in 2013 and has held the presidency since (53).
Lacking the charismatic legitimacy and personal relationships of Chávez, Maduro has
taken Venezuela from hybrid regime status to authoritarian—Freedom House assigned Venezuela
as “not free” in 2020 with a score of 14 out of 100 (the organization listed Venezuela as “partly
free” in 2012, Chávez’s last full year in office) (Freedom House 2021). Since 2013, falling oil
prices have inhibited the Maduro government’s ability to support the chavismo welfare programs;
this caused the electoral base of the chavistas to abandon Maduro and join protests organized by
the opposition coalition between 2014 and 2017 (Pilar García-Guadilla and Mallen 2019, 70). The
opposition was able to achieve a supermajority in the Venezuelan legislative body, the National
Assembly, in 2015 (65). The body was later stripped of most of its authority by the regime-loyal
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), while the Maduro Administration created a parallel body of
loyalist law makers known as the Constituent Assembly (65-6). Maduro’s actions were often met
by popular protests, which the government violently repressed (65-6). Maduro’s increasingly
authoritarian tactics and fraudulent interference in the 2018 Presidential Election led to National
Assembly Leader and opposition lawmaker Juan Guaidó’s claim to the office of Interim President
in January 2019 (Cohen 2019). The U.S. along with many regional and European states quickly
recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela (Deutsche Welle 2019).
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. announced economic sanctions against the Maduro
government. While financial and travel sanctions against the Venezuelan government and its
officials date back to the Chávez Administration due to narcotics trafficking and failure to
cooperate with antiterrorism efforts, the sanctions from 2019 onward were much more severe
because they targeted the oil sector (Seelke 2021). The Trump Administration used Executive
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Order 13850 to target the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PdVSA. This blocked the Maduro
government from accessing the company’s assets and prohibited U.S. transactions with PdVSA
(Seelke 2021). The sanctions allowed for some exemptions, but any payments to PdVSA would
be made to blocked accounts. While still targeted sanctions, the implication was that they would
have much more comprehensive effects—after all, oil makes up 99% of Venezuelan export
earnings (Bull and Rosales 2020; OPEC 2021). In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O.
13884 which placed further financial sanctions on individuals within the Maduro government, but
also allowed for financial sanctions against non-U.S. individuals and firms for cooperating with
the Maduro government. These secondary sanctions would function by blocking foreign firms
from U.S. markets and financial services (Seelke 2021; Eaton and Cohen 2019).
In February 2020, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions against Rosneft, a Russian-owned
oil company that had been the primary exporter of Venezuelan crude since the sanctions against
PdVSA went into effect (Astakhova and Tétrault-Farber 2020; Bryza 2019). By March Rosneft
had ceased its activities in Venezuela and sold its Venezuelan assets to an unnamed Russian stateowned company (Astakhova and Tétrault-Farber 2020). The Trump Administration continued to
threaten and implement secondary sanctions throughout 2020 and in August announced that the
U.S. would continue to recognize Guaidó as the legitimate president even after the December
National Assembly elections when Guaidó would likely lose his constitutional grounding for his
claim to the presidency (Spetalnick and Zengerle 2020). That is precisely what happened, and the
Maduro government attained control of the National Assembly. The U.S. and EU rejected the
results, yet the EU did rescind its recognition of Guaidó as interim president—opting for the
revised title “privileged interlocutor” (Vasquez and Laya 2020; Reuters Staff 2021).
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January 2021 marked two years since Guaidó’s declaration and more intensive U.S.
economic sanctions. While Guaidó remains a relevant figure within the Venezuelan crisis, the
Maduro government has demonstrated its ability to survive despite international condemnation
and severe economic coercion. President Trump’s Venezuela policies were given a level of
attention not often afforded to Latin American relations, and the drastic step of cutting off the U.S.
oil industry from one of its greatest suppliers indicates just how important this issue was for the
administration. Unfortunately, this seems to be an apparent case of failure based on U.S. goals as
stated by Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin:
The United States is holding accountable those responsible for Venezuela’s tragic
decline, and will continue to use the full suite of its diplomatic and economic
tools to support Interim President Juan Guaidó, the National Assembly, and the
Venezuelan people’s efforts to restore their democracy. Today’s designation of
PdVSA will help prevent further diverting of Venezuela’s assets by Maduro and
preserve these assets for the people of Venezuela. The path to sanctions relief for
PdVSA is through the expeditious transfer of control to the Interim President or a
subsequent, democratically elected government (US Department of the Treasury
2019).
Maduro retained power despite seemingly costly sectoral sanctions. The purpose of this case study
is to determine why the Maduro government was able to resist and in what ways did U.S. policy
come up short. Using the three different explanations from the previous section, this case study
proceeds by assessing the utility of each explanation in determining why sanctions failed to oust
Maduro Venezuela in 2019 and 2020. This section will conclude by comparing the merits of the
different explanations for the Venezuelan case.
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Adaptation
The adaptation hypothesis posits that if sanctions impose economic costs on the target, but the
target government is able to prevent those costs from triggering political costs then the sanctions
are unlikely to succeed. A cursory glance of the Venezuelan case seems to support this hypothesis
due to the apparent fact that the Maduro government had become increasingly authoritarian in the
years leading up to the sanctions episode. Despite the near decade long economic crisis and
resultant collapse of the social programs that upheld the chavismo system, President Maduro and
his party (United Socialist Party of Venezuela—PSUV) have maintained control of the
government. Yet, this is not enough to explain how Maduro has been able to withstand the most
intense U.S. and international pressure against his government thus far. Here, this paper examines
evidence of the three indicators for the adaptation hypothesis and a brief discussion of the strengths
and weaknesses of the hypothesis.
A necessary condition for the adaptation hypothesis is economic costs for the target
because a lack of economic costs would indicate that adaption did not play a significant role in the
failure of sanctions. In the case of Venezuela, simply assessing the economy as a whole could be
misleading given that the country has been in an economic crisis for several years. ENCOVI, an
annual study by Venezuelan universities, has determined that food insecurity, lack of access to
healthcare, and maternal deaths have reached their most severe levels since the PSUV first came
to power in 1998 (Caracas Chronicles 2018). A study published by Human Rights Watch points
to similar evidence to argue that the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela preceded oil sanctions and
that targeted sanctions prior to the oil sanctions did not carry with them serious humanitarian
concerns (Doocy 2019). Therefore, to have a better understanding of the economic effects of U.S.
sanctions beginning in 2019, this study looks to the oil industry specifically.
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Since 2014 Venezuelan crude oil production has consistently declined. In recent years,
production has fallen from an average of 1,911 thousand barrels per day (tb/d) in 2017, to 1,354
tb/d in 2018, and finally 793 tb/d in 2019 (OPEC 2020, 28). Even with this information, it is not
clear whether the drastic decrease in 2019 was the result of the crisis or global trend in the oil
industry. Based on data from OPEC, Venezuelan crude exports made up 5.2% of total OPEC crude
exports in 2018 yet accounted for 23.5% of total decline in OPEC crude exports between 2018 and
2019. Venezuela’s disproportionate share of the decline of crude exports indicates that the
dramatic drop in 2019 production is uniquely Venezuelan. Comparing Venezuela’s decline in
exports across time reveals that the country experienced a 20.6% decline in 2018, yet a 33.1%
decline in 2019. This indicates that the dip in 2019 is even unusual for Venezuela. It is also worth
pointing out that the US dollar (USD) value of Venezuelan petroleum exports rose by 10.0% in
2018 and then fell 35.1% in 2019. These calculations—all based on available OPEC data—suggest
that the U.S. oil sanctions did in fact impose economic costs on the Venezuelan government. While
it is hard to determine the direct costs on the government, Venezuela has suffered from endemic
corruption under Maduro and his predecessor—between the two of them the Venezuelan
government embezzled up to 400 billion USD (Pring and Vrushi 2019, 15). Any significant hit on
ostensibly public funds interrupts the cash flow to Maduro and his winning coalition.
To further assess the adaptation hypothesis, this case study considers any adaptive
institutions or structures of the Maduro government that allow it to keep economic costs from
creating political costs. For the case of Venezuela, adaptive features include political developments
that have further centralized Maduro’s power and fostered internal regime loyalty. Buxton argues
that these features have been crucial for Maduro’s political survival because he lacks the charisma
and ideological authority of his predecessor, Chávez (2020). Freedom House reports over the last
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several years illustrate this point well. The organization notes that Venezuela lacks an independent
judiciary; in 2017 the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) effectively stripped the opposition
controlled National Assembly of its power. That same year, Maduro created the National
Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution, however, in reality the body has functioned as a
parallel regime-loyal legislature. Although those developments occurred before the sanctions
episode, a weakened National Assembly would later hinder the opposition’s ability to pressure the
Maduro government. Another relevant factor is Maduro’s reliance on the military to maintain
power; in 2019, the country’s score for freedom from “political forces that employ extrapolitical
means” dropped from 1 to 0 out of 4 (Freedom House 2021).
There is evidence that these institutions have allowed Maduro to prevent political costs
from developing as a result of sanctions. A recent and obvious example is the outcome of the
December 2020 legislative elections. The PSUV won control of the National Assembly amidst
fraud, low turnout, and a boycott by Guaidó and his allies (Vasquez and Laya 2020). Maduro is
exceedingly unpopular, and elections no longer represent a legitimate mandate as the Maduro
government has created a system that all but guarantees victory for the PSUV (Oner 2021, 14-5).
In the summer prior to the 2020 elections, the TSJ removed various opposition lawmakers from
their legislative leadership positions. This limited any serious chance of the opposition maintaining
power in the National Assembly (15). Maduro’s control of the nominally democratic National
Assembly contributed to his adaptation efforts by stripping Guaidó of his source of legitimacy.
Additional evidence of adaptive institutions at play comes from evidence that the military
has considerable control over policy. Their increased role in the Maduro government dates back
to a 2014 TSJ ruling that allows military personnel to function in civilian and military positions
simultaneously (Bílek and Vališková 2020, 10). This has resulted in substantial overlap between
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the military, political, and business elite. An emblematic figure in this regard is General Vladimir
Padrino Lopéz who serves as Minister of Defense, head of a state-company called Anonymous
Military Corporation of Mining, Oil, and Gas Industries, and leader of the Great Sovereign Supply
Mission (GMASS), which has given him de facto control over all other executive ministries (101). Even if hundreds or perhaps thousands of soldiers are willing to defect—which some sources
claim—high level military officials have remained loyal (Rueda 2020). Despite the costs imposed
by sanctions, Maduro’s efforts to coopt the military elite have left them satisfied with the status
quo.
The final indicator for assessing the adaption is the relative power of the political
opposition, as they are the responsible actors for imposing political costs on the target
government—especially so if there is intense loyalty within the government as is the case in
Maduro’s administration. In Venezuela, the primary opposition is the Democratic Unity Coalition
(MUD) and for the past two years has supported Guaidó as its leader. MUD started as a catch-all
group of anti-chavistas in the early 2010s and is composed of preexisting parties (Buxton 2017,
5). The current iteration of MUD even contains former Chávez allies that do not support Maduro
(4). This raises the concern of political fracture within the opposition, which is further supported
by the fact that factions within MUD do not accept the same strategies. Moderates favored a
transitional government, while radicals would accept nothing less than Maduro’s resignation
(Smilde and Ramsey 2020a, 169-70). These divisions considerably weakened the opposition’s
hand in negotiation, but also obscured MUD’s platform—an issue that has plagued the coalition
since its creation (Buxton 2017,6).
Another problem that the opposition faced is their leader himself, Juan Guaidó. The young
lawmaker has a knack for political survival himself after having not been arrested in the two years
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that he has been serving as interim president. Additionally, U.S. support has afforded him a
significant advantage with access to blocked accounts previously controlled by the Maduro
government (Smilde and Ramsey 2020a, 170). Unfortunately, Guaidó was unable to translate that
support into domestic political capital in 2019 or 2020. Twice in the months following U.S. oil
sanctions, Guaidó’s personal calls for military defections went unmet. Guaidó’s supporters claim
that the lack of defections was the result of fear and surveillance; however, regional scholar Julia
Buxton argues it is more likely the case that the opposition simply possess “a weak grasp of the
military as an institution” (2019, 130). Furthermore, critics pointed out Guaidó’s tendency to limit
participation and inclusion in his transition planning and his close ties to the former Trump
Administration (133). While it is certainly an asset for MUD to have a leader they can unify behind,
Guaidó brings along concerns of his own.
A more in-depth assessment of the economic costs of sanctions to Venezuela, pre-existing
adaptive features of the Maduro government, and the relative power of the Venezuelan opposition
supports the adaptation hypothesis. Guaidó’s inability to seriously threaten the Maduro
government’s hold on power, regime-loyal institutions, and military support despite severe losses
in the country’s most important industry offers an adequate explanation of sanctions failure. Still,
adaptation leaves one question unanswered. What is the root of military and crony loyalty during
intense sanctions? This explanation has demonstrated that Maduro is able to maintain power
because he has very few people to keep happy (a small winning coalition) and lacks any serious
challengers, but it does not address how he is able to keep individuals like General Lopéz Padrion
satisfied. The evasion hypothesis will likely fill in that logical gap. This section ends with a more
detailed comparison of the hypothesis.
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Evasion
The evasion hypothesis argues that if third party actors are able to mitigate the economic and
political costs of sanctions for the target government then sanctions are likely to fail. As with the
adaptation hypothesis, this explanation seems appropriate for the Venezuelan case given the well
know ties between Venezuelan and various U.S.-adversarial states. It is also common knowledge
that the Maduro government is involved with drug trafficking organizations—especially along the
Colombian border. However, it may very well be the case that these third parties do not play as
significant a role as popular press headlines would lead readers to believe. This section takes a
closer look at three indicators to determine how effective the evasion hypothesis is in explaining
the Venezuelan case.
Quickly after Guaidó made his claim to the presidency, many in the international
community recognized him as the legitimate leader. However, a handful of states continued to
recognize the Maduro government. Among them are China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and Turkey. While
this is not an expansive list these are states that offered more than merely words of encouragement
to the Maduro government following the sanctions of 2019 and 2020. These are the sanctionbusters and black knights of the Venezuelan sanctions episode. From January 2019 to March 2020,
Russian-owned company Rosneft was the primary exporter of Venezuelan crude (Bryza 2019;
Astakhova and Tétrault-Farber 2020). As middleman, Rosneft maintained Venezuela’s crude
exports to both China and India (Myers and Viscidi 2020; PTI 2019). Between the implementation
of sanctions and the August announcement of secondary sanctions China imported an average of
350 tb/d of Venezuelan oil (Cohen and Parraga 2020). In that same timespan, Indian imports
hovered around 200 tb/d. (Seshasayee 2019). When the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions against
Rosneft, Iran began importing Venezuelan crude and exporting refined products back to Venezuela
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(Gedan 2020). Venezuela engages in a gold-for-food program with Turkey which does not violate
oil sanctions but still helps to maintain the Maduro government’s power (Oner 2020, 12-3).
Finally, Cuba supports the Maduro government with security detail and intelligence training in
exchange for Venezuelan oil (Fonseca and Polga-Hecimovich 2020, 11-2).
It is clear that third parties actively undermined U.S. sanctions in 2019 and 2020. The next
indicator is evidence that suggests the extent to which sanction-busters helped the Maduro regime
mitigate economic costs of sanctions. Given Special Representative for Venezuela Elliot Abrams
remarks that “Rosneft is really central to the regime’s survival,” Rosneft seems a prudent point to
begin this analysis (Bryza 2019). In 2019 Venezuela was in considerable debt to Rosneft, and the
firm accepted payments in the form of crude oil (Rouvinski 2020, 6). Rosneft’s transactions with
the Maduro regime did not end there. Venezuela’s refining industry has been in a death spiral in
recent years so Rosneft provided Venezuela with gasoline throughout 2019 (ibid.). Additionally,
as the preceding paragraph describes, Rosneft maintained Venezuelan oil exports to international
buyers. While it is difficult to quantify just how significant of a role Rosneft played, a closer look
at the effects of sanctions against Rosneft is helpful.
According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, after the initial drop
in Venezuelan Petroleum production after sanctions against PdVSA, monthly production did leveloff until August 2019 with the announcement of potential secondary sanctions. However, by the
end of 2019 and the first two months of 2020, production had recovered to the same levels as
before the announcement of secondary sanctions (but not to pre-PdVSA-sanctions levels). Then in
March 2020—coinciding with the announcement of sanctions against Rosneft—production levels
took their most dramatic hit since the first months of 2019. This drop in production occurred two
months before the total global production dropped as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in May
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2020. (Refer to Fig. 1, for a graph of Venezuelan monthly petroleum production). While causal
links are not perfectly apparent, this evidence suggests that Rosneft indeed mitigated the economic
costs of U.S. sanctions against the Maduro government.
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Following the sanctions against Rosneft, Iran took on a more important role in Venezuelan
crude exports. Rendon et al. from the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that
Iran simply could replace Rosneft (2020)—Figure 1 appears to demonstrate that fact, with
production remaining stagnant following the drop in early 2020. However, the Iranian lifeline
offers a significant advantage to the Maduro government: Iran is much less likely to comply with
U.S. demands in the face of secondary sanctions given that the state already faces significant U.S.
sanctions (Gedan 2020). Throughout 2020 Iranian tankers devised creative measures to evade U.S.
efforts to halt crude oil-for-gasoline trade between Venezuela and Iran—for instance, the use of
false call-signs. Venezuela also paid Iran in gold in exchange for assistance in rebuilding
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Venezuela’s domestic oil industry (Yacoubian and Hanna 2021). While Iran was not been able to
live up to Rosneft, this may not have mattered. Relatively constant Venezuelan petroleum
production levels through the end of 2020 indicate that the effect of sanctions had reached a
ceiling—a ceiling maintained by Iranian support of the Maduro government. Additionally, Iran
offered Maduro and those loyal to him consistent support due to Iran’s relative imperviousness to
secondary sanctions. That level of reliability may have been all that Maduro needed.
The final indicator for the evasion hypothesis is non-economic third-party support of the
Maduro government. In this regard the support of Russia and China are crucial as these two
countries blocked any multilateral sanctions that may have originate from the UN Security
Council. In February 2019, Russia and China voted against and subsequently prevented the
passage of a U.S.-proposed resolution to the Venezuelan political impasse—the resolution would
have recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president until free and fair election could be held
(Brown 2020). Additionally, while China reduced trade and investment in Venezuela following
the U.S. oil sanctions, the Maduro government still owed a considerable amount to China having
borrowed more money from China than any other Latin American country (Myers and Viscidi
2020; China-Latin America Database). For this reason, Beijing maintained ardent diplomatic
support for Maduro and condemned any efforts to unseat the government (Ferchen 2020, 10-1).
Moscow’s non-economic support of the Maduro government stretched a bit further.
Russian defense industries have strong commercial ties with Venezuela through the sale of military
technology (Rouvinski 2020, 8). Throughout 2019, Russian maintenance specialists and
technicians continued to operate in Venezuela (Brown 2020). A report from Reuters found that
Russian private military contractors (PMCs) arrived in Venezuela prior to the 2018 Presidential
Election, and more arrived in January 2019. The same month that Guaidó declared himself to be
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the legitimate president of Venezuela. The PMCs are reportedly from Wagner Group—a group
that observers believe the Russian government secretly controls. The Wagner Group was involved
in both Ukraine and Syria (Tsvetkova and Zverev 2019). There is little evidence that indicates the
extent of Russian security personnel in Venezuela, but their presence alone demonstrates
Moscow’s stake in Venezuela—one that it will not easily give up.
The last black knight in the Venezuelan case is Cuba. The island nation is not well-situated
to offer much by way of economic support, but Cuba has been more than willing to offer its
expertise in the area of coup-proofing. This particular aspect of Venezuela-Cuba relations dates
back to 2008 when the two socialist states reached an agreement whereby Cuba would offer
training to Venezuelan intelligence agents and review and restructure the Venezuelan military
intelligence apparatus. The ultimate goal was to refocus intelligence efforts on soldiers, officers,
and officials within the Venezuelan ranks rather than outside targets (Berwick 2019). Ties between
the two intelligence communities continued to grow and Cuban intelligence and security personnel
were most certainly operating within Venezuela during 2019 and 2020. Estimates vary, some
putting it at a couple thousand and others claiming tens of thousands (Fonseca and PolgaHecimovich 2020). As with Russia, the mere presence of Cuban agents in Venezuela is significant
for prevent Maduro’s political survival. Especially so considering the Cuban government’s
apparent aptitude for regime survival.
The commercial activity of Rosneft in 2019, the more recent oil-for-gasoline trade with
Iran, and Cuban and Russian security cooperation with Venezuela all support the evasion
hypothesis. Furthermore, this explanation fills the gap left by the adaptation explanation—oil
exports through Rosneft and Iran has allowed Maduro to keep his winning coalition satisfied. And
those that are not are found with the help of Cuban expertise and personnel. This hypothesis is
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especially compelling due to the quantitative data from Fig. 1 that appears to confirm just how
significant of a role Rosneft played in supporting the Maduro regime through 2019. That being
said, it is difficult to prove that the black knights in this case were the decisive factor in sanctions
failure. Sanctions were very effective in limiting Venezuelan oil production even though they did
not outright halt exports to third parties. This begs the question, at what point is third-party support
sufficient to undermine sanctions? At best, this hypothesis offers additional information for
explaining why the Maduro government would not agree to further negotiations after the summer
of 2019. Rosneft and later Iran built the government’s confidence in a resistance strategy.
Enforcement and Implementation
The enforcement and implementation hypothesis states that if the sender fails to impose economic
costs or pursue other mechanisms that incentivize compliance with the sender’s demands then
sanctions are likely to fail. Unlike the last two hypotheses, the enforcement and implementation
hypothesis is not as apparently relevant in the Venezuelan case. This paper thus far has established
that sanctions caused serious problems for the Venezuelan oil industry. This would indicate that
the Trump Administration therefore partially successful. However, there are still aspects of the
sanctions episode that reveal the Administration’s shortcomings—especially in terms of
concurrent policy measures. As with the last two hypotheses, this section proceeds with an analysis
of three different indicators.
The first indicator is the degree and manner in which the U.S. achieved cooperation with
its sanctions efforts against the Maduro government. Fortunately for the Trump Administration,
hemispheric and European states maintained a similar outlook regarding both Maduro and Guaidó.
As this paper has covered, governments across the region and world quickly recognized Guaidó
as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. As far as sanctions go, the international community appears
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to respect the limits the U.S. has imposed on trade with Venezuela. Many U.S. allies have imposed
sanctions of their own against the Maduro government. The EU first imposed individual travel and
financial sanctions against Venezuelan officials in 2017 and continued to add people to the list of
sanctioned individuals in 2018, 2019, and 2020 (European Council 2021). In September 2019, the
Organization of American States (OAS) voted to enact the hemispheric Rio Treaty defense pact to
impose targeted sanctions against Maduro—16 of 19 states voting in favor. The OAS does not
have the power to impose sanctions, rather the vote signified the will of individual member states
to impose sanctions against Maduro (McBride 2019). Finally, Canada added additional Maduro
government officials to their pre-existing list of sanctioned individuals in April 2019 (Canada
2021).
Although Russia and China prevented the possibility for multilateral UN Security Council
sanctions, the preceding paragraph demonstrates that much of the Latin American and European
community agreed that punishing the Maduro government was acceptable. Lack of regional and
EU support could have been a non-starter for the maximum pressure campaign that the U.S. went
on to impose. The second aspect of sanctions cooperation in the Venezuelan case is the use of
secondary sanctions, which the Trump Administration first announced in August 2019. Despite
the cautions concerning secondary sanctions within the literature, it seems that they were
successful in preventing foreign firms from filling in the gaps left after U.S. firms were barred
from operating with PdVSA. Specifically, Chinese firms cut back on Venezuelan crude oil imports
in August 2019 (Reuters Staff 2019). Fig. 1 appears to illustrate the effect of the August
announcement and, of course, the drop in production following sanctions against Rosneft. While
the literature does not consider secondary sanctions to be within best practices, secondary
sanctions may have worked in this case due to apparent U.S. willingness to take on significant
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costs. Foreign firms saw that the Trump Administration was willing to cut the U.S. off from one
of its greatest crude oil suppliers, and in turn, the firms took that to mean the Administration would
not hesitate to target non-U.S. firms.
The second relevant indicator for the enforcement and implementation hypothesis is
concurrent policy. To achieve concessions from a target state, a sender likely needs to do more
than just impose sanctions. In the Venezuelan case, U.S. concurrent policy experienced mixed
results at best. The most significant of those policies was U.S. support of Guaidó. Inviting him to
the 2020 State of the Union Address was likely a morale booster for the opposition after a year of
political stalemate, but the real brunt of U.S. support was financial. First, U.S. support allowed
Guaidó to access blocked accounts—most importantly the accounts of Citgo Petroleum, a foreign
asset of PdVSA (Smilde and Ramsey 2020a, 170; Spetalnick and Ellsworth 2019). Additionally,
in September 2019, USAID announced $52 million in assistance to Guaidó and the opposition
(USAID 2019). This level of financial support for the Venezuelan opposition is by no means
trivial, but when considered along with the relative lack of power that the opposition wields in
Maduro’s regime, it is clear why money was not enough to give Guaidó the upper hand.
Beyond financial support for the opposition, the U.S. employed limited diplomatic efforts.
As this paper has already described, the U.S. attempted and ultimately failed to pass a Security
Council resolution for a democratic transition in February 2019. In the summer of 2019, a series
of negotiations between the Maduro government and Guaidó team convened in Oslo and later
Barbados with Norway mediating. The substance of the negotiations was never confirmed, but the
opposition claims that the Maduro government agreed to a transitional government. In exchange,
the opposition would urge the U.S. for phased sanctions relief (Smilde and Ramsey 2020a, 1678). The Trump Administration was not opposed to these negotiations when they began, but later
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on signaled to the Guaidó team that the U.S. would not support any agreement that lowered
sanctions before free and fair elections (170). The negotiations effectively fell through on August
6th, 2019 when the Trump Administration announced secondary sanctions (168). The U.S. took on
a more direct diplomatic role in March 2020 with the announcement of the Democratic Transition
Framework for Venezuela. This plan called for a transitional government and the expulsion of all
foreign security from Venezuela. Maduro’s foreign minister quickly dismissed the Framework
(Rendon 2020). It appears that secondary sanctions may have squandered the most serious chance
at democratization in Venezuela.
The final indicator for the enforcement and implementation hypothesis is timing. Sanctions
are most effective when the sender implements them suddenly so as to avoid giving the target
ample time to adapt. The data represented in Fig. shows that the January 2019 sanctions had a
significant impact on the Venezuelan oil industry. However, the January 2019 sanctions were not
the first sanctions that the Trump Administration implemented against the Maduro government. In
2017, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 which blocked the Maduro government from accessing
U.S. financial markets; in March and May of 2018, President Trump issued two additional
executive orders that restricted U.S. financial transactions with the Maduro government (Seelke
2021). Despite these earlier sanctions, it does not appear that timing was an issue for the January
2019 sanctions episode. Since the earlier sanctions were much narrower in scope, they do not
appear to have had facilitated sanctions adaptation in the lead up to the sanctions against PdVSA.
This point is difficult to convey without access to data from the individual accounts of
Venezuelan officials. While it is possible that members of Maduro’s winning coalition built up
personal resilience to the effects of sanctions, the shock of the 2019 sanctions surpassed any effects
of any previous U.S. measures against the government’s greatest source of revenue. According to
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data from the USEIA, the drop in oil production between February and March 2019 was the
greatest monthly decline since that experience between December 2002 and January 2003, which
was the result of an opposition-organized general strike against President Chávez (CNN 2002).
Had the Trump Administration threatened secondary sanctions at the time of the January 2019
sanctions, the impact likely would have been greater, but this does not imply that timing of
sanctions was a problem. The fact that the Maduro government indicated interest in a transitionary
government during the negotiations in the summer of 2019, further supports the idea that the
sanctions of January 2019 were sufficiently severe and not diluted by previous sanctions.
The manner and extent that the U.S. achieved cooperation with sanctions and the timing
do not appear to support the enforcement and implementation hypothesis. The evidence suggests
that secondary sanctions worked well and that the Trump Administration imposed sanctions within
a sufficiently concentrated timescale. Insufficient concurrent policy does seem to support the
enforcement and implementation hypothesis. Specifically, the lack of U.S. support during the
summer 2019 negotiations and the delayed and unilateral Transition Framework hindered any
realistic hopes of resolution. Available evidence did not support every indicator as with the last
hypotheses. This may indicate that the sender centric approach is not the best explanation for
sanctions failure in the Venezuelan case. However, this approach did pinpoint the problems in U.S.
policy, by revealing that imposing economic costs was not the problem. Instead, a lack of policy
designed to incentivize compliance hindered the efficacy of sanctions against the Maduro
government.
Comparing Alternative Explanations
The three hypotheses that this case study explored each help to explain a different aspect of the
failure of sanctions against the Maduro government in 2019 and 2020. However, there are limits
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to each explanation. The adaptation hypothesis is especially well-suited for demonstrating why
sanctions on the Venezuelan oil industry did not spur internal opposition within the Maduro
government. Military, political, and business elite are one in the same—to have turned on Maduro
could have jeopardized that arrangement. Still, the actual causal mechanism that keeps elites
satisfied with the status quo is difficult to understand using the adaptation explanation. This stems
largely from the fact that it is difficult at this time to access evidence of internal sources of wealth.
These sources are likely illicit and therefore not available for analysis in the same way that data
on oil exports is.
That data is precisely what offers the evasion hypothesis an advantage over the adaptation
hypothesis. Rosneft’s role in facilitating Venezuelan oil exports and gasoline imports is explicitly
clear. The continued flow of oil revenue cannot be overstated in this case because Venezuela has
adopted “defensive authoritarian rentierism,” whereby the primary purpose of oil revenue is to
protect the Maduro government rather than support public programs (Bull and Rosales 2020, 113).
This supports Green’s contention that—however import adaptation may be—the target must
address the material needs of its political base before engaging in adaptation (1983, 82).
Nevertheless, this hypothesis also runs into the issue of availability of quantifiable data to assess
the effects of Cuban security and intelligence support. Without confirmed figures, U.S. scholars
and policy makers may be susceptible to overstating Cuba’s role as well as that of Russian defense
technology companies and PMCs. Ultimately, third-party support appears to be necessary for the
Maduro government’s survival, but not decisive in the failure of sanctions. The U.S. was still able
to impose significant costs despite mitigation efforts. For this hypothesis to offer greater utility in
explaining failure, the data would have to demonstrate that Rosneft facilitated a stronger recovery
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for the Venezuelan oil industry. The negotiations in the summer of 2019 indicate that third-party
support was not enough to dissuade the Maduro government from seeking a resolution to the crisis.
Ironically, despite the apparent success of U.S. sanctions in imposing significant economic
costs on the Maduro government, the enforcement and implementation hypothesis offers the best
explanation of sanctions failure. The Guaidó team’s greatest bargaining chip in the aforementioned
negotiations was the lifting of U.S. sanctions, and they lost that advantage when the U.S.
announced the potential for secondary sanctions in August 2019. Sources from the negotiation
claim that Maduro was open to a transition government. Had the U.S. been a more receptive to the
terms of the negotiations, the sanctions may have achieved their ultimate goal despite the adaptive
features of the Maduro government and third-party support. The Maduro government’s
participation in the negotiations was its way of signaling its interest pursing a path toward sanctions
relief rather than resistance. This path might have included provision such as Maduro stepping
away from politics, but the PSUV and military elite remain prominent actors in the new
government. It is entirely possible that negotiations still would have fallen through, but the Trump
Administration’s failure to capitalize on the negotiations offers an insight into the deeper flaws of
the Administration’s Venezuela policy in 2019 and 2020. It seems that the President’s team
overestimated how far economic sanctions could serve their ultimate goal of ousting Maduro. The
two most prominent scholars on U.S. Venezuela policy, Geoff Ramsey and David Smilde, present
a similar analysis of the Administration’s failed policy. They cite the significance of U.S.
unwillingness to support mediation efforts in the Maduro government’s decision to pull out of
negotiations (2020b, 16-7). The pair also notes that U.S. sanctions and concurrent policy, while
very costly to the Maduro government, were implemented in a manner that “raise[d] exit costs for
political and military elites who may have once considered supporting a transition” (9). While their
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view of sanctions failure is largely in agreement with the conclusion put forth in this paper, they
do not include a thorough analysis of how third-party states contributed to sanctions failure.
The ability of the enforcement and implementation explanation to identify the decisive
factor for sanctions failure in Venezuela demonstrate the overall merit of that approach as
compared to the other two. That being said, the adaptation and evasion hypotheses are crucial for
understand the context of the failure of U.S. policy. This case study shows that policy failure is
ultimately attributable to the sender itself. However, scholars and policy makers cannot assess
sanctions policy in a vacuum. An intricate understanding of the domestic political dynamics within
the target state and third-party support of the target government are necessary for planning and
improving policy. The next case study looks at an instance of sanctions success to further explore
the relationship between the three competing hypotheses.
Sanctions Against Iran: 2010 – 2015
The U.S. and Iran have not had formal relations since the Revolution of 1979 that brought
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has increasingly
viewed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a regional challenger and threat to oil supply chains in the
Persian Gulf (Kaussler and Newkirk 2012, 352-3; 356). Economic sanctions have been the
preferred method of the U.S. for curbing Iranian support of terrorist groups and limiting Iranian
strategic capabilities. From the inception of the Islamic Republic to 1996, sanctions primarily
limited the activities of U.S. firms. Since the signing of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, U.S.
sanctions have mostly targeted foreign firms for dealing with Iranian entities (Katzman 2014, 12). While the goals of U.S. sanctions of Iran have been multifaceted for decades, 2006 marked a
shift in both U.S. and international priorities in response to Iran’s renewed emphasis on its nuclear
program (Katzman 2016, 1).
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Iran’s peaceful nuclear program date back to the Pahlavi dynasty—the predecessor to the
Islamic Republic—and in 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six years
later Iran signed the NPT’s Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). This agreement involves inspections to ensure that signatory states’ nuclear programs
remain peaceful (i.e., not developing weapons). Throughout the 1980s and 90s Iran developed its
nuclear sector with foreign assistance (primarily Russia). Revelations of previously undisclosed
nuclear sites and the discovery of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium led to international
pressure on Iran to sign the Additional Protocols of the Safeguards Agreement in 2003. That same
year, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment. In 2005, the IAEA found Iran to not be in
compliance with the Safeguards Agreement and a few months later reported Iran to the UN
Security Council. Finally, in December 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737
implementing the first round of multilateral sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program (Nikou
2020).
In the following years, the Security Council adopted increasingly severe sanctions
measures culminating with Resolution 1929 in June 2010. The Resolution banned the sale of major
combat systems, imposed stricter financial sanctions, and allowed UN member states to target the
Iranian energy sector with unilateral sanctions (Katzman 2014, 3). Between 2010 and 2013,
Congress and the Obama Administration imposed increasingly restrictive sanctions against Iran.
In July 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act (CISADA) which targeted foreign firms that trade and invest in Iran’s energy sector. In
February 2012, President Barack Obama issued E.O. 13599 which implemented financial
sanctions against entities linked to the Iranian government or Iranian Central Bank (CBI)—this
coincided with the EU’s announcement of an embargo on Iranian oil (Katzman 2018, 3; Rezaei
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2017, 79-80). In July 2012, President Obama issued E.O. 13622 which sanctioned entities involved
in sales of Iranian oil and petrochemical products (Katzman 2018, 14). In June 2013, President
Obama implemented additional financial sanctions with E.O. 13645. These sanctions targeted
industries outside of the energy sector and most importantly hampered trading of the rial, Iran’s
currency (14-5).
The sanctions cited above are not a comprehensive list—the U.S. has implemented various
sanctions for different reasons and listing out all of them is not necessary for the purpose of this
case study. The significance of the sanctions listed above is that they were suspended as part of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA—the Iran nuclear deal). The deal included the
lifting of EU and UN sanctions as well (40). The five permanent members of the Security Council
and Germany (P5+1) reached the nuclear deal with Iran in July 2015. The deal limited Iran’s
enrichment activities and its stockpile of enriched uranium (Hafezi et al. 2015). Both sides of the
negotiations hailed the deal as an historic achievement—though U.S. Republicans were critical—
and partial sanctions relief came on January 16, 2016, Implementation Day (Hafezi et al. 2015;
Katzman 2018, 40). While the status of the JCPOA in 2021 is not nearly as hopeful following
President Trump’s decision to back out of the deal and reports of Iranian noncompliance, back on
Implementation Day, sanctions had accomplished the Obama Administration’s goal of limiting
Iran’s nuclear program.
The goal of this case study is to identify why sanctions were successful in compelling Iran
to reach the nuclear deal. It is important to note that praise for the JCPOA was not universal, and
from that perspective sanctions were not successful. Upon completion of the agreement,
Republicans criticized it for lifting sanctions, and a few presidential hopefuls indicated that they
would reimpose sanctions if elected (Hafezi et al. 2015). Republicans argued that the eventual
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lifting of an arms embargo as part of the agreement would serve to strengthen Iran’s role in the
Middle East (Spetalnick and Zengerle 2015). Other critiques of the JCPOA aside, Republicans
seemed to have been intent on limiting Iranian capabilities through sanctions alone—a policy of
containment—while the Obama Administration viewed sanctions as a path to a nuclear deal. For
that reason, this study will proceed with the understanding that sanctions were a success in the
sense that they brought Iran to the negotiation table. Assessing the factors that contributed to the
success of sanctions will offer relevant insights for an informed discussion of the Trump
Administration’s use of sanctions against Venezuela and U.S. sanctions policy in general. As with
the Venezuelan case study, this section proceeds with an analysis of three different explanations
of sanctions outcomes in the Iran case. Each section examines the same indicators as in the
Venezuelan case study. Since this is a case of sanctions success, this section assesses the inverse
hypotheses for the competing explanations.
Adaptation
The adaptation inverse hypothesis states that if sanctions impose significant economic costs on the
target and the target government fails to mitigate political costs that arise from economic costs,
then sanctions are likely to succeed. Initially, this approach does not seem all that relevant for the
Iran case. The Islamic Republic is a theocracy with highly centralized authority in a single
individual, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, this study reveals that there are important aspects
of the Islamic Republic that make it more susceptible to economic coercion than one might expect
of an autocracy. This section examines three indicators to discover deficiencies in the Iranian
government’s ability to mitigate political fallout from sanctions.
First, it is necessary to demonstrate that the target had to endure significant economic costs.
If this was not the case, then it would be difficult to assess the causal mechanism by which
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sanctions compelled the Iranian government to enter negotiations and eventually accept the nuclear
deal. (Compliance without imposing economic costs is possible, but sanctions success would be
the result of a credible threat of sanctions or fear of future costs. In such a case, deficiencies in the
target’s adaptation would not be helpful in determining why sanctions were successful). According
to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), between 2011 and 2012 Iran’s GDP (at
current prices) experienced its sharpest decline in a decade—a loss of over 30%. Additionally,
2012 marked Iran’s lowest Real GDP growth (-7.7%) since the 1980s (IMF 2021). These aggregate
indicators demonstrate at the very least that the Iranian economy was suffering to a significant
degree within the timeframe of the most severe U.S. and EU sanctions on the Iranian oil industry.
A closer look at the Iranian oil industry helps to establish stronger causal links between
sanctions and the deterioration of the Iranian economy between 2010 and 2013. Like Venezuela,
Iran is an OPEC member, and is heavily dependent on oil exports. At the time of the sanctions
episode in question, oil accounted for 80% of Iran’s export revenue and 50-60% of total
government revenue (EIA 2013). The U.S. and EU saw this vulnerability and many of the sanctions
imposed between 2010 and 2013 reflect that reality. Financial sanctions in that period limited the
Iranian government’s ability to receive payments even if it was able to continue to export oil
(Rezaei 2017, 81). Using data from the U.S. EIA, Figure 2 illustrates the decline in Iranian
petroleum production. The decline in production coincides with increased sanctions in 2012
(2021). In addition to the drop in production, between 2011 and 2013 Iran’s oil export revenue fell
from $100 billion to $35 billion (Rezaei 2017, 82). This information presents a compelling case
that sanctions were indeed economically costly for Tehran. The following indicators explore
whether the Islamic Republic was able to mitigate any political fallout from these costs.
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There are two primary adaptive features within the Islamic Republic: the concentration of
power in the hands of a religious head-of-state and the regime loyal Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC). Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, his successor Ayatollah Khamenei,
has been the senior cleric and Supreme Leader of Iran. While there does exist a parliamentary body
(the Majlis) and a president with nominal control of economic policy, ministerial appointments,
and the Supreme National Security Council, Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on any policy
(Nader 2013, 1-2). The president does have legitimate authority in his own right “shap[ing] the
tone and tenor of the regime’s foreign policy” (6). However, it is the Supreme Leader who has de
facto control over who becomes president. The Guardian Council—an Islamic body headed by the
Supreme Leader—is responsible for selecting and disqualifying presidential candidates. By
manipulating the ballot, Khamenei is able to exercise considerable control over elections without
resorting to traditional means of fraud (Sherrill 2014, 72). The presidency even provides a bit of
buffer for Khamenei as he can blame the president for unpopular policies. It would make sense
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that this level of institutional authority would protect Khamenei from political costs derived from
sanctions.
The second adaptive feature of the Iranian government, the IRGC, is a security force that
is loyal to the Supreme Leader. Since its inception the organization wielded considerable power,
but 2009 ushered in a new era of IRGC influence in Iranian politics. First, the domestic
paramilitary wing of the IRGC played an integral role in repressing massive protests following
Iran’s 2009 presidential election (Banerjea 2015, 95). Second, Khamenei responded to those events
by reorganizing the Iranian intelligence community (94). The Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS), which reports to the president, lost much of its power; the IRGC took on most of the
domestic intelligence responsibilities previously held by MOIS (97). The IRGC Intelligence
Organization consists of seven divisions, one of which reports directly to the Supreme Leader (97).
With the loyalty and protection of the IRGC and a significant level of institutional authority, it
seems that Ayatollah Khamenei would be able to weather political costs from severe sanctions.
However, a look at the 2009 and 2013 elections suggests that there are barriers that hamper the
adaptive features of the Iranian government.
In 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was up for reelection. He was a divisive figure
even among conservatives, and polling indicated that Ahmadinejad’s moderate challenger, Mir
Hussein Mousavi would win (Sherill 2014, 65; 68). However, the final tally indicated that
Ahmadinejad had won triggering accusations of fraud and widespread protests (68). As described
above, the IRGC repressed those protests and Ahmadinejad remained president. The events of
2009 influenced Khamenei’s choices in the 2013 election. The Guardian Council approved six
conservative candidates, one moderate, and one reformist. The reformist was relatively unknown,
and the six conservatives would prevent a single conservative from earning enough votes to win.
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Sherrill notes that “had Khamenei intended for a conservative to win, he would never have
permitted such a ballot” (71). This led to the victory of moderate Hassan Rouhani—the chief
nuclear negotiator for the Khatami Administration (1997-2005) and outspoken critic of President
Ahmadinejad’s foreign and economic policies (71; Nader 2013, 14). Rouhani was a candidate that
could mend fractures among conservatives—Rouhani being a cleric himself—without triggering
popular backlash like in 2009 (72). The 2009 and 2013 elections demonstrate that despite his
immense authority, the Supreme Leader perceived serious threats to his political and religious
legitimacy when sanctions were at their worst. While it is difficult to ascertain exactly why
Khamenei selected Rouhani, the election of a moderate suggests that Khamenei was indeed facing
political costs—or at the very least attempting to stave off potential costs.
The Supreme Leader’s woes did not end there; even the loyalty of the IRGC was not a
given. Khamenei’s decision to use the organization to repress protests in 2009 led to an increase
in the organization’s relative power within the Iranian political landscape (Sherrill 2014, 68-9).
Though dated prior to the intense sanctions of the 2010s, a publication from RAND Corporation
predicted three potential paths for the future role of the IRGC: the organization may have
considerable influence in selecting Khamenei’s successor, Khamenei’s successor may originate
from the IRGC, or the IRGC will launch a military coup and seize power from Khamenei (Wehrey
et al. 2009, 98-91). As of 2021, none of those predications have panned out, but they do provide a
glimpse of the IRGC’s rising influence around the start of the sanctions episode—a popular theory
at the time argued that the IRGC was slowly transforming Iran into a military dictatorship (Alfoneh
2013, 77-8). It is also important to note that President Ahmadinejad was an IRGC veteran and
filled government positions with IRGC personnel (Sherrill 2014, 65; 67). Finally, the rise of the
IRGC coincided with it becoming increasingly engrained in the Iranian private sector—especially
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high-ranking officials. This made the IRGC susceptible to economic pressure (Banerjea 2015, 104105). All of this suggests that the IRGC was itself a threat to Khamenei, rather than a protective
force in the face of rising economic costs.
The final indicator for the adaptation hypothesis is the relative strength of the political
opposition. As previous paragraphs have indicated, the political structure of the Islamic Republic
is highly centralized. The Supreme Leader has final say, especially on issues involving Iran’s
nuclear program (Nader 2013, 2). That being said, Khamenei did allow a moderate candidate to
win the 2013 presidential election. Going into the election there were three factions. First were the
Pro-Khamenei conservatives who generally supported a policy of resistance to the U.S (11-2).
Then there were the Pro-Rafsanjani technocrats who favored a more pragmatic approach to foreign
policy (Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani served as president from 1989 to 1997, the Guardian
Council barred him from running in 2013). This faction ultimately supported Rouhani (12).
Finally, there were the reformists who were the furthest left of the factions and highly critical of
conservative clerics. Without a serious presidential contender of their own, they too supported
Rouhani (12). Considering the Rouhani campaign’s focus on economic recovery, it seems that
oppositional forces desired sanctions relief and supporting Rouhani was their way of pressuring
the Iranian government to abandon the resistance strategy of Ahmadinejad (14). Electoral success
in the Islamic Republic of Iran is not an ideal indicator of the opposition’s political strength, but
Rouhani’s victory does suggest that moderate and reformist voting blocs wielded decisive power
in 2013 which paved the way for more fruitful negotiations.
Despite the apparent authoritarian structure of the Iranian government, the indicators
appear to support the adaptation hypothesis. Even with limited information concerning Ayatollah
Khamenei’s decision-making process, the adaptation approach presents a plausible narrative as to
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why the Supreme Leader chose not to resist sanctions. The 2009 and 2013 elections reveal that
Ayatollah Khamenei was concerned for his legitimacy from the fear of further popular protests
and the rising influence of the IRGC. Still, this explanation falls short of fully explaining why the
regime perceived negotiations as the optimal path forward. While the oil industry did take quite
the hit, it was not as bad as the Venezuelan case would turn out in 2019—when sanctions failed.
Furthermore, Iran is one of the top oil producers in the world, which begs the question why Tehran
felt that it could not outlast sanctions efforts. The next explanation may offer some ideas
concerning Iran’s threat calculations.
Evasion
The evasion inverse hypothesis states that if third party actors are not able to mitigate economic
and political costs of sanctions for the target government then sanctions are likely to succeed. This
hypothesis seems promising for the Iran case due to the apparent support of China and Russia
within the Security Council. However, voting in favor of a Security Council resolution is not
sufficient evidence for full sanctions cooperation. An analysis of how the third parties behaved
following the adoption of the resolution offers a more accurate picture of sanctions cooperation.
This section looks at three indicators to determine whether a lack of third-party support contributed
to the success of sanctions.
Central to any third-party support of Iran is the country’s energy sector. The most severe
sanctions in the years just prior to the JCPOA targeted the oil industry, so any black knight would
have had to mitigate costs within that industry to have a significant effect. Based on that criterion
there were three potential sources of third-party sanctions busting. The first was India, which had
built economic ties with Iran through the 2000s (Soltaninejad 2017, 22). However, even with
India’s growing oil demand, the country felt obligated to support the U.S. on nuclear issues and
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decreased its imports from Iran (30-1). In 2013, Indian imports of Iranian oil dropped by 37.81%
(Thirarath 2016). Another potential black knight was Russia, a country with which Iran had
important strategic overlap concerning competition with the U.S., peace in the Caspian Sea, and
energy exports (Kasting and Fite 2012, 33; 36). Although Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1929
in 2010, it opposed unilateral energy sector sanctions (37-8). Yet the stance of the Russian
government did not abate private firms’ fears of secondary sanctions from the U.S. and EU (Parker
2016, 4). Lukoil—the second largest Russian oil company—began the process of reducing
investments in Iran in 2010, and in 2012 the Vice-CEO announced that Lukoil had no plans to
renew contracts in Iran due to international sanctions (Kasting and Fite 2012, 36-7). Between 2010
and 2013, total Russian exports to Iran fell from $3.4 billion to $1.2 billion (Katz 2015).
The final potential black knight for Iran was China. China was Iran’s largest trade partner
in 2012, when sanctions were at their worst (Aizhu 2012). As Asian and European firms pulled
out of Iran from fear of secondary sanctions, China stepped in to help develop Iran’s domestic
energy sector (Harold and Nader 2012, 10-1). Similar to Russia, China spoke out against unilateral
sanctions that went beyond the requirements of Resolution 1929 (Kasting and Fite 2012, 22).
China-Iran ties within the energy sector are integral to the two countries bilateral relations. Around
the time that the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 China was the largest importer of
Iranian oil, and as sanctions increased, Iran viewed China as its economic lifeline (Harold and
Nader 2012, 10; 5). This information suggests that China was Iran’s greatest hope for evading
sanctions.
The next indicator for the evasion hypothesis is the degree to which third parties actually
supported the target government. With Russia and India ruled out above, this section will focus on
China. Like Russia, China opposed any unilateral sanctions targeting the Iranian energy sector. In
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2012, the state-run Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong Corp announced that it would continue
to import Iranian oil despite secondary sanctions (Aizhu 2012). Unfortunately for the Iranian
government, Zhuhai Zhenrong Corp was a bit of an outlier. Like for many Russian firms,
secondary sanctions were enough to slow down Chinese engagement in the Iranian oil industry
(Harold and Nader 2012, 12). Following the U.S. Congress’s passage of CISADA, the Chinese
government reportedly instructed oil companies to “slow down” their projects in Iran (Downs
2012, 2). Between 2010 and 2011, China National Petroleum Corporation had only invested $18
million in a project with a contract that stipulated $400 million of Chinese investment annually.
(Downs 2012, 2; Aizhu and Buckley 2011). Iran went as far to suspend a contract with China
National Offshore Oil Corporation due to the project’s lack of progress (Downs 2012, 2).
The reduction in Chinese investment was followed by a decline in Chinese imports of
Iranian oil. From 2011 to 2013, China had decreased imports of Iranian oil by 115 thousand
barrels/day (tb/d). The U.S. State Department deemed these reductions sufficient to offer Chinese
firms sanctions exemptions, and China continued to maintain imports a little over 400 tb/d for the
duration of the sanctions episode (Almond 2016). This is not to say that China’s loss of its Iranian
supply was insignificant, China had to pivot to Iraq and Angola to fulfill its energy needs (EIA
2015). It is much more difficult to determine how significant the loss was for Iran. Compared to
losses from the EU oil embargo—587 tb/d—the drop in Chinese imports is far less. At the very
least the reductions in Chinese imports demonstrates that China was either unwilling or unable to
mount a serious challenge to U.S. and EU secondary sanctions.
The final indicator for the evasion hypothesis is non-economic support from third parties.
For the purpose of this indicator, it is relevant to discuss Iran-Russian relations leading up to and
during the sanctions episode. Although Russia maintained a strong commercial interest in Iran’s
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peaceful nuclear sector, Russia did not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon (Kasting and Fite
2012, 44-5). Throughout President Ahmadinejad’s first term (2005-2009), Russia offered to enrich
uranium for Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, but Iran maintained that it was entitled to enriching
uranium on its own. This frustrated Moscow, and Russia voted in favor of the four sanctions
resolutions in the Security Council between 2006 and 2010 (Katz 2015). Russian support of
Resolution 1929 in 2010 was especially angering for Iran because it prevented Iran from
purchasing the S-300 air defense system from Russia (Kasting and Fite 2012, 42). The greatest
non-economic support that Russia could have offered was a veto of any of the four resolutions.
Moscow’s decision further supports the idea that Iran had to face the international community on
its own.
The story is not all that different with China. While Beijing did work to delay Resolution
1929 and advocated for watered-down sanctions that would not affect normal commercial relations
with Iran, China voted in favor of the Resolution (Kasting and Fite 2012, 21-2). China’s motives
for supporting the various resolutions are much more complicated than Russia’s. Graver argues
that Chinese support of Security Council sanctions were not indicative of a commitment to nonproliferation as was the case with Russia (2011, 80-1). China’s primary goal in the lead-up to the
sanctions episode was balancing its commercial interests in Iran (i.e., oil) without angering
Washington (77). Therefore, China developed a strategy of supporting Iran within the limits of
multilateral sanctions (83). Another factor at play is China and Russia’s mutual support for each
other within the Security Council (Stent 2020, 7). Vetoing any of the resolutions may have
jeopardized that arrangement. Even if China’s support of NPT is unclear, its decision not to veto
Resolution 1929 suggest that China was willing to prioritize its bilateral relations with the U.S.
and Russia over Iranian nuclear aspirations.
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The indicators support the evasion hypothesis, and this approach builds upon the adaptation
explanation. Resolution 1929 signaled Russia’s and China’s unwillingness to stand up for Iran
against the U.S. The behavior of oil companies from those countries further solidified that
message. This suggests that back-sliding on sanctions was not likely to happen any time soon—at
least it is reasonable to assume that that is how the Iranian government perceived the Russian and
Chinese stance. This helps to put Khamenei’s domestic situation in greater context; he knew the
economic situation would only grow worse. One issue with this approach is the absence of
evidence that suggests what level of economic support is sufficient to evade sanctions. Would the
sanctions outcome have been any different had China not reduced oil imports at all? It seems that
this decisive figure when evasion becomes plausible would vary by case—especially when
comparing the Iran and Venezuela cases. This suggests that the evasion explanation is best suited
for supplementing alternative explanations.
Enforcement and Implementation
The enforcement and implementation inverse hypothesis states that if the sender is able to impose
economic costs within a sufficiently constricted timespan, achieve effective cooperation, and
successfully pursue concurrent mechanisms to incentivize compliance then sanctions are likely to
succeed. At least initially, this approach seems relevant for the Iran case given the degree of
international cooperation with sanctions and apparent diplomatic efforts that went into the creation
of the JCPOA. In other words, there is quite a bit of non-sanctions policy to consider. It is also
important to note that the multilateral nature of the sanctions episode in question leaves the notion
of sender open to various interpretations. This analysis interprets sender to mean the U.S., while
acknowledging the fact that cooperation of other states played an integral role. In fact, the first
indicator explores that very question of cooperation.
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With regards to cooperation, there are three primary aspects integral to the Iran case:
Resolution 1929, secondary sanctions, and EU unilateral sanctions. Resolution 1929 was the most
expansive arms embargo and strictest set of multilateral sanctions that the Security Council
imposed against Iran for its nuclear program (Aljazeera Staff 2012). As detailed earlier both Russia
and Chine supported the resolution, though both advocated for limits on any sanctions that could
affect existing commercial ties with Iran, especially within the energy sector. This begs the
question whether U.S. support of Resolution 1929 offered more than a symbolic gesture of
cooperation? Russia-Iran trade following the JCPOA implementation suggests that the Resolution
did in fact contribute to U.S. goals. Iran and Russia renegotiated the contract for the sale of the S300 air defense system in April 2015 and between January and August 2016 bilateral trade
increased by 70.9%, most of which was in military contracts (Parker 2016; BNE IntelliNews Staff
2016). This rapid resumption in trade after sanctions relief indicates that Resolution 1929 had
indeed limited Iran’s trade, and anticipation of that post-sanctions windfall may have served as an
incentive for Iran to participate in negotiations with P5+1.
Outside of the UN Security Council, Washington’s primary instrument for securing
sanctions cooperation was secondary sanctions against foreign firms. Secondary sanctions made
up the bulk of U.S. efforts in this case because direct commercial ties with Iran were negligible
from decades of unilateral sanctions (Katzman 2016, 5-7). Additionally, the JCPOA would go on
to require the U.S. to lift only secondary sanctions that were implemented in response to Iran’s
nuclear program (60). These secondary sanctions appear to have worked. The primary consumers
of Iranian oil across Asia—China, India, Japan, and South Korea—all decreased their imports
(Aizhu 2012). Although both the Chinese and Russian governments objected to such sanctions,
firms in both countries were wary of facing penalties and reduced their business with Iran (Kasting
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and Fite 2012, 22; 37-8). Between 2011 and 2014, the reduction in Asian imports of Iranian crude
made up roughly half of Iran’s losses in exports—537 tb/d out of 1,203 tb/d (EIA 2015). These
figures demonstrate that U.S. secondary sanctions were successful in achieving sanctions
cooperation.
The final component of sanctions cooperation, and perhaps the most significant, was EU
unilateral sanctions. The two primary contributions of the EU were its 2012 embargo on Iranian
oil and its banning of Iran from SWIFT, an online financial institution that facilitates international
payments. The oil embargo was responsible for almost half of the decline in Iranian crude exports
between 2011 and 2014, an estimated 587 tb/d (EIA 2015). And the SWIFT ban—in conjuncture
with E.O. 13599—prevented Iran from receiving oil payments (Rezaei 2017, 81). The lack of EU
opposition to U.S. secondary sanctions in this case compared to past instances of the U.S. imposing
secondary sanctions provides further indications of EU cooperation (Patterson 2013, 137-8). While
the EU oil embargo ultimately reflected the security concerns of the EU, the Obama
Administration did lobby the EU to increase sanctions against Iran including pressure to implement
the SWIFT ban (Jaseb and Pawlak 2012; Patterson 2013, 139; Blenkinsop and Younglai 2012). It
is difficult to determine how pivotal the U.S. was in attaining EU cooperation, but at the very least,
Resolution 1929 created an image of unity that the allowed the EU to introduce unilateral
sanctions.
The next indicator is concurrent policy to incentivize compliance with the demands of the
sender. An important angle in the Iran case is the threat of military intervention. Throughout the
sanctions episode, the Obama Administration maintained that all options were on the table, but a
diplomatic solution would be preferable (Kajouee 2014, 131). The Administration also spoke out
against the Israeli threat of a preemptive airstrike. The U.S. did not give any indication whether
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military action against Iran should occur if Iran became capable of developing a nuclear weapon
or once it had already created one—Israel maintained the former position (Landler 2012). All of
this is to say that the U.S. maintained a vague and ambiguous stance with regard to military action.
Combined with the fact that Israel can have considerable sway over U.S. regional policy (Kajouee
2014, 131-2), President Obama’s insistence that military action was a last resort was likely not all
that reassuring for Tehran. Therefore, sanctions policy in the Iran case may have benefited from
Iran’s perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli attack.
Much more pivotal in sanctions success were the diplomatic efforts that the U.S.
implemented in attaining Iranian compliance. In the early years of Obama’s first term, the
Administration attempted to engage the Iranian government, but by 2012, U.S. policy was
primarily predicated on pressure (Kaussler and Newkirk 2012, 369). This began to change
following P5+1 talks in February 2013. Following the international negotiations, Deputy Secretary
of State William Burns and national security advisor to the Vice President Jake Sullivan flew to
Oman for a secret meeting with Iranian officials. Although this meeting did not lead to significant
developments in negotiations, it did create a bilateral channel between the two countries. This
channel became all the more important after President Rouhani’s electoral victory in the summer
of 2013. Between August 2013 and January 2014, there were five more meetings—meetings in
September led to the monumental Obama-Rouhani phone call and a meeting between Secretary of
State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (Rozen 2014). According
to senior U.S. officials at the time, these secret talks were “instrumental” in reaching the interimnuclear deal or Joint Plan of Action (JPA) (Mohammed and Hafezi 2013). The JPA allowed the
P5+1 negotiations to carry on for two more years until the parties agreed on the JCPOA. The JPA
itself provided limited sanctions relief—a carrot that prompted continued cooperation from Iran
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(Katzman 2014, 1). While the U.S. was only one of seven parties in the negotiations that resulted
in the nuclear deal, the story of the secret bilateral channel demonstrates the pivotal role of the
Obama Administrations diplomatic efforts in achieving sanctions success.
The final indicator for the enforcement and implementation hypothesis is the timing of
sanctions. The incremental approach of the Security Council sanctions—increasingly severe with
each resolution between 2006 and 2010—may have hindered their effects (Rezaei 2017, 77-8).
China even delayed the passage of each resolution, further dragging out the process (Graver 2011,
76). The fact that the U.S. had been imposing unilateral sanctions for decades further threatened
the prospects of a quick and intense strike on the Iranian government’s economic interests.
However, U.S. and EU sanctions on the Iranian oil industry through 2012 seem to have been
implemented within a sufficiently concentrated timeframe. In January, the EU announced its oil
embargo (though it did not go into effect until July to allow time to fulfil outstanding contracts);
in February, Obama issued E.O. 13599 (targeted oil transactions through the Iran Central Bank);
in March, SWIFT banned Iran; in July, Obama issued E.O. 13622 (targeted Iranian petrochemical
sales) (Rezaei 2017, 80-1; Katzman 2018, 14). The SWIFT ban was especially surprising to the
Ahmadinejad Administration, as it only found out about move three days prior to its
implementation (Rezaei 2017, 82). Returning to Figure 2, Iranian petroleum production suggests
that the rapid implementation of oil sanctions in the first half of 2012 was successful in issuing a
swift blow to Iran’s energy sector.
The indicators all support the enforcement and implementation hypothesis. The U.S.
effectively garnered international support for sanctions through the UN Security Council and
reduced sanctions-busting through secondary sanctions. The Obama Administration’s strategic
ambiguity concerning the military option and creation of the secret bilateral channel complimented
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the sanctions effort. Finally, U.S. and EU oil sanctions were sufficiently concentrated to deal
serious damage to the Iranian energy sector before it had time to adapt. The enforcement and
implementation approach also highlights an important point: the success of sanctions in this case
was heavily dependent on multilateral support. The EU embargo was responsible for half of the
decline in Iranian oil exports, and Russian and Chinese support of Resolution 1929 granted the
U.S. a level of legitimacy that it does not often enjoy when employing sanctions.
Comparing Alternative Explanations
Similar to the case of failure in Venezuela, each of the three explanations offers relevant details
for understanding sanctions success in Iran, but each explanation is still incomplete on its own.
The adaptation approach reveals Supreme Leader Khamenei’s struggle to maintain legitimacy
through the presidential election of 2013 but does not fully explain why the regime felt compliance
was the optimal path forward. The evasion approach offers a possible explanation: insufficient
Russian and Chinese support eliminated Iranian hopes of outlasting sanctions efforts. The primary
issue with the evasion hypothesis is the difficulty in determining how decisive third-party support
is in the outcome of sanctions episodes. China cut back on Iranian oil imports, but why wouldn’t
the remaining revenue be enough to support Khamenei and his winning coalition?
The adaptation hypothesis once again shines through. As mentioned earlier, the IRGC was
engrained within the Iranian economy and therefore felt the effects of sanctions. Since the goal of
the sanctions was to limit Iran’s nuclear program, it would have been reasonable for the IRGC to
assume that sanctions relief was not contingent upon who was leading the government. Given that
and the IRGC’s rising power at the time, it is possible the IRGC influenced Khamenei’s decision
to participate in the P5+1 talk—even if indirectly. However, this explanation risks oversimplifying
Khamenei’s calculations, otherwise he simply would have capitulated to demands much sooner.
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There must have been internal factors that motivated the decision to continue with the nuclear
program—pride, legitimate desire for peaceful nuclear power, or perhaps more nefarious purposes.
Therefore, the adaptation hypothesis still is not able to explain why Iran participated in
negotiations.
The enforcement and implementation hypothesis offers the final and decisive piece of the
puzzle. Specifically, the secret diplomatic efforts of the Obama Administration. The bilateral
channel offered Khamenei a way out of his predicament. It is important to acknowledge the
importance of Rouhani’s victory here, as his Administration really allowed the bilateral talks to
make headway—compared with Ahmadinejad’s uncompromising stance. Following the effective
targeting of the Iranian oil industry, the Obama Administration capitalized on that damage
diplomatically, rather than simply demanding that Iran halt its activities. Limited sanctions relief
further incentivized compliance as it demonstrated that negotiations were a viable path for Iran
toward economic recovery. The underlying threat of U.S. and/or Israeli military action further
encouraged Iranian participation in negotiations. The most succinct explanation for sanctions
success in this case is a synthesis of the adaptation and enforcement and implementation
approaches. Sanctions were successful because they exacerbated domestic threats to Supreme
Leader Khamenei’s legitimacy, and were accompanied by threats of U.S. military action and
diplomatic efforts that signaled that negotiations offered a legitimate chance of sanctions relief.
This explanation is similar to that of Iran expert Farhad Rezaei who argues that sanctions were
successful because they imposed severe economic costs on the Iranian population which eroded
the Islamist regime’s popular legitimacy (2017, 84-6). That being said, the analysis of this paper
is more skeptical than Rezaei in attributing compliance to a decrease in popular legitimacy. This
paper understands threats to the Supreme Leader’s legitimacy as originating in the political elite.
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Assessment of Alternative Explanations
The preceding case studies used three indicators to assess each of the alternative explanations for
sanctions outcomes. This section seeks to explore how effective this approach is by reflecting on
the availability and quality of evidence that the research uncovered.
The first indicator for the adaptation explanation was the economic impact of sanctions on
the target state. Evidence for this indicator was easy to find, and both cases presented a very clear
picture: sanctions had a profound effect on the target economy. Evidence for the second indicator,
the existence and function of adaptive institutions, was also readily available. This is likely due to
the fact that both Iran and Venezuela are adversarial authoritarian states which attracts scholars
and security experts. Much of the evidence was the expert opinions of other scholars as primary
sources were difficult to find. Between the Iran and Venezuelan sanctions episode, Freedom House
began publishing detailed reports on each country—as opposed to simply assigning a score. This
more detailed data was helpful in identifying adaptive features in the Maduro government without
having to turn to a secondary source. Evidence for the final indicator, strength of political
opposition, was primarily composed of expert opinion, specifically the work of Julia Buxton and
Alireza Nader (for the Venezuela and Iran cases respectively). However, election results also
served as evidence of the oppositions’ relative strength. Overall, there was sufficient evidence for
each indicator, but there was still not much data to indicate how much sanctions affected targeted
individuals.
The first indicator for the evasion explanation was the presence of black knights, or thirdparty actors involved in undermining sanctions. It was not difficult to establish that black knights
were involved in both cases; however, each case study relied on different sources of information.
Given the recency of the Venezuelan sanctions episode, that case used wire services articles (i.e.,
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Reuters), whereas the Iran case utilized secondary publications. Gathering evidence for the second
indicator, the degree to which third-party states actually provided support, was much more difficult
to come by. Both cases required consulting a combination of news websites, USEIA data, and
secondary publications. By synthesizing information from various sources, the case studies were
able to draw general conclusions concerning third-party support, but absolute figures were not
readily available. Evidence for the final indicator, non-economic third-party support, originated
mostly from secondary sources. The Venezuela case relied on a series of reports on Venezuelan
bilateral relations. The Iran case turned to secondary scholarly sources—Kasting and Fite 2012
was particularly helpful. Ultimately, evidence for the evasion approach was not as straightforward
as that of the adaptation explanation. While this does not necessarily reflect poorly on the
explanation itself, it made the research process more difficult.
The first indicator of the implementation and enforcement was the manner and degree of
cooperation with the sender. The Venezuela case study turned to official government websites to
determine how other states cooperated with the U.S. whereas the Iran case looked at secondary
sources. While the sources differed between the case studies, both cases used the same basic types
of evidence—UN Security Council activity, U.S. secondary sanctions policy, and third-party
response to U.S. policy. Paired with USEIA data, this evidence demonstrated how effective
cooperation was in both cases. Evidence for the second indicator, concurrent policy by the sender,
was a bit more difficult to collect for the two cases. Given the complexity of U.S. foreign policy,
judgement calls were necessary to determine which policy elements qualified as relevant
concurrent policy. This led to a high degree of diversity in sources in both cases including popular
press articles, secondary scholarly publications, and statements from U.S. officials. The final
indicator, timespan of the sanctions episode, was simple to establish in both case by comparing
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USEIA data on oil production to the dates of sanction implementation. Overall, evidence for the
implementation and enforcement explanation was the most widely available. This explanation also
required less speculation than the other two because U.S. interests and motivations were much
easier to surmise than that of the target or third-party states.
Based on the results depicted in the table below, the enforcement and implementation
performed best of the three alternative explanations due to clear evidence for two of the three
indicators. While assessing concurrent policy was a bit subjective, there was still a large pool of
secondary sources to refer to. Despite the availability of evidence for each of the three indicators
for the adaptation explanation, it ranks second among the alternative because a lack of data on
internal revenue flow hinders the explanation’s ultimate utility. This critique might be less
significant for cases assessing historic sanctions episodes for which records of internal revenue
flow might be more widely available. Finally, the evasion explanation ranks last due to the fact
that it did not offer a clear indication of how important third-party support was in either case. It is
important to acknowledge that this approach might have been more effective in assessing sanctions
outcomes with more robust data analysis. An interesting avenue for future research might be
whether there is a critical point when third-party support has a pivotal impact on sanctions outcome
(e.g., support that meets a certain percentage of the target’s GDP).
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Case/ Explanation
Adaptation

Assessment of Alternative Explanations
Venezuela Case
Iran Case
+ OPEC and USEIA
+ OPEC and USEIA
data
data
+ Freedom House
+ Secondary scholarly
reports
sources
+Secondary scholarly
+ Blog (Iran Primer)
sources
+ Election results
+ Election results
-Limited scholarly
sources on more recent
developments

General Conclusions
+ High availability of
quantitative data
+ Significant scholarly
attention
- No data on internal
revenue flow

Evasion

+ Wire services
(Reuters)
+ Research organization
reports
+ USEIA data
- No country-by-country
breakdown of oil
exports

+ Secondary scholarly
sources
+ USEIA data
+ New websites
- No country-by-country
breakdown of oil
exports

+ Sufficient evidence to
determine that thirdparty states were
undermining sanctions
- Conflicting and
imprecise figures made
it difficult to determine
the actual degree of
third-party support

Enforcement and
Implementation

+ Government websites
(Third-Party sanctions
policy)
+ USEIA data
+ Secondary scholarly
sources (Smilde and
Ramsey 2020a)

+ Secondary scholarly
sources
+ USEIA data
+ Popular press article
+ Statements from U.S.
officials

+ Evidence presented
clear picture of the
effects of cooperation
and timespan of the
episode
- Required assumptions
concerning the relative
importance of different
concurrent policies

Discussion: Comparing Case Studies and Policy Implications
This discussion section seeks to compare the findings of the two case studies. The hope here is that
a comparison of sanctions failure and success will reveal relevant details that might contribute to
more informed sanctions policy. First, it is necessary to acknowledge the limits of this comparison.
There were certain factors at play in the Iran case that favored sanctions success, factors that simply
were not present in the Venezuelan case. The first of these factors was the credible threat of U.S.
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military action. Despite President Obama’s insistence that the military was an option of last resort,
it was a possibility that Tehran could not take lightly. Even with U.S. reassurance, the Israeli threat
was present as well. For Iran to have rejected negotiations or to have pulled out before a settlement
was reached would have lent tacit legitimacy to the military option. This offered U.S. sanctions
policy an advantage that was not present in the Venezuela case. Considering that the developments
in Venezuela did not pose a security risk to the U.S. and the fact that Russia was backing Maduro,
military intervention in Venezuela was likely never a serious option even if President Trump
maintained an all-options-on-the-table outlook. In fact, Frank Mora, a former deputy assistant
secretary of defense from the Obama Administration criticized the Trump Administration’s
posturing; Mora claimed any potential for a naval blockade or military intervention was doubtful
based on U.S. military presence in the region at the time (Torres 2020). While the U.S. and several
other regional states in did invoke the Rio Treaty in September 2019, a majority of the member
states that voted in favor of the measure denounced the use of military force (Meyer 2019, 2-3).
The second factor that favored sanctions success in the Iran case was the goal of sanctions
itself. While seeking a nuclear deal with Iran was no small task, the U.S. was not bent on regime
change or any level of democratization. This led to two significant advantages for sanctions policy.
First, this helped to maintain Russian and Chinese support. Without overstating the importance of
their cooperation, Resolution 1929 was at least a symbol of unity that altered Iran’s risk
calculations. Not seeking regime change also makes it easier for the sender to negotiate with the
target government—the target is obviously more likely to comply with demands in cases when
compliance is not contingent upon the target government losing power. The goals of the Trump
Administration were simply loftier. By maintaining the strict goal of regime change, the Trump
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Administration brought on the ire of international rivals. Furthermore, seeking to oust a regime
makes it much more difficult to negotiate with that regime.
Despite those factors that favored success in Iran, the cases are remarkably similar in key
aspects. In both cases, the U.S. resorted to targeted sanctions on the target’s oil industry—targeted
sanctions that had comprehensive effects because both Iran and Venezuela are oil-dependent
rentier states. In both cases the U.S. was successful in imposing significant economic costs, and in
both cases, sanctions prompted the target government to join negotiations to resolve the sanctions
episode. Another relevant similarity between the two cases is the legitimacy of the end goals of
the sanctions episode. The various Security Council resolutions in the Iran case reveal the general
international consensus that Iran should not attain a nuclear weapon. The international
community’s rapid recognition of Juan Guaidó as the president of Venezuela in January 2019
suggests the general acceptance of regime change as the end goal. While there were notable
dissenters in the Venezuela case (still, China and Russia favored a peaceful resolution and
supported the summer 2019 negotiations), the important point is that the U.S. enjoyed significant
international agreement with its goals in both cases. With an understanding of the above
similarities and differences, this section proceeds with a discussion of five policy implications
from the two cases.
Implication 1: Exacerbate Threats to the Status Quo
The first implication from the two case studies is that sanctions should exacerbate threats to the
status quo political order. This does not necessitate the threat of total political disintegration, but
economic sanctions must harm some fundamental aspect of the target’s hold on power. Sanctions
efforts were successful in achieving this outcome in both cases. The centralized political structure
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in both Iran and Venezuela were dependent on oil revenue, and sanctions significantly limited both
countries’ abilities to export oil and receive payments for oil sales.
Threatening the status quo is integral to sanctions success because it forces the target
government to make a difficult decision: Whether to risk further damage to the existing politicaleconomic system or pursue a path that would result in sanctions relief. In the Venezuela case,
President Maduro had to decide between either risking the loss of support from the military and
other members of his winning coalition by non-compliance or agreeing to a path toward sanctions
relief that would likely lead to him losing a substantial amount of power at least for a time. In the
Iran case, Supreme Leader Khamenei had to decide between either risking the loss of IRGC
support and his popular legitimacy or sacrificing elements of Iran’s nuclear program. In both
instances, the target government signaled its interest in the path toward sanctions relief. Maduro
agreed to the summer 2019 negotiations and Khamenei allowed Rouhani, an avowed pragmatist,
to win the presidential election. In both cases, the costs of sanctions were so great that the target
government was not willing to risk resistance—at least initially.
Implication 2: Capitalize on Costs of Sanctions, Offer Viable Path for Power Brokers
The second implication is that the sender must follow up effective sanctions with a viable path
toward sanctions relief. The sender can communicate this path explicitly or through subtle means,
but regime power brokers have to understand that compliance is a favorable option. This offer
should come after the target signals its interest in sanctions relief. Comparing the Venezuela and
Iran case highlights just how pivotal this aspect of sanctions policy is. The Trump Administration
failed to offer serious hope of sanctions relief, whereas the Obama Administration instigated the
secret bilateral channel.
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It is important to offer a viable path to keep the terms of compliance favorable for the target
government. In the Venezuela case, the refusal of the U.S. to consider sanctions relief for the 2019
negotiations led Maduro to reconsider his options: either continue with negotiations without any
guarantee of sanctions relief or risk threats to the status quo from continued sanctions. The Trump
Administration’s stance also served as a signal to the military that even if they ousted Maduro,
sanctions relief would not be a given—further reducing the threats that sanctions imposed on the
status quo political order. In the Iran case, Khamenei had to choose between either continued talks
with the U.S. and P5+1 or risking his legitimacy through a strategy of resistance. Furthermore, the
IRGC remained a serious threat to Khamenei, since the goals of the sanctions episode were not
incompatible with an IRGC controlled government. The comparison of the two cases demonstrates
the importance of capitalizing on the difficult situation that intense sanctions can force the target
government into before it recalculates its risk assessment.
Implication 3: Take What You Can—Before Someone Else Does
The third policy implication is that the sender must be prepared to accept concessions that do not
meet the original goals of the sanctions episode. Furthermore, this is a time sensitive issue because
the target will continue to reevaluate its options and third-party support may tip the target’s
evaluation of options in favor of noncompliance. Expecting too much from the target significantly
reduces the chances of fruitful negotiations. This is exactly how the Venezuelan situation panned
out, whereas in the Iran case, the U.S. was content with interim agreement (JPA) that the P5+1
talks produced.
This implication should not be taken to suggest that the U.S. should indiscriminately accept
the terms of the target, rather policy makers should be aware of what sanctions can realistically
achieve. In the Venezuela case, the Trump Administration did not see the 2019 negotiations as the
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opportunity that they were and indicated as much with the August announcement of secondary
sanctions. Several months later in March 2020, the Trump Administration announced the
Transition Framework—an arrangement not all that dissimilar to reports of the transition
government from the 2019 negotiations. The Maduro government quickly rejected the Transition
Framework, perhaps because a year of support from Rosneft and later Iran gave the government a
bit more confidence in its ability to withstand sanctions. Turning toward the Iran case, the Obama
Administration accepted the JPA and began the process of limited sanctions relief. Republican
opposition to the JPA and later JCPOA suggests that the U.S. was not accepting all that it wanted
but the Obama Administration was willing to take what it could get. Had the U.S. rejected either
agreement, this would have risked the P5+1 negotiations falling through. In such a scenario, it is
not hard to imagine Russia or China backsliding on sanctions. This development could have altered
Iran’s appraisal of its policy options in favor of a strategy of resistance, similar to the Venezuela
case. This comparison illustrates how important it is for the sender to seriously consider terms that
do not necessarily meet its original hopes for the sanctions episode, and when third-party support
runs the greatest risk of harming sanctions outcomes.
Implication 4: Maintain a Demonstrable Plan for Sanctions Relief
The fourth policy implication is that the sender should have a clear plan for sanctions relief from
the outset of the episode and should communicate that plan—and a willingness the implement it—
to the target government. Rather than a simple statement entailing sanctions relief upon
compliance with demands, the sender should develop an organized plan for sanctions relief
complete with criteria for achieving sanctions relief, a possible time schedule, estimates on total
funds that the target would be able to access (from frozen/blocked accounts), and economic
recovery aid. This is precisely the sort of incentive that O’Sullivan advocates for in explaining
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optimal sanctions policy (2003, 291). This obviously raises the costs of sanctions episodes for the
sender, but evidence from the case studies suggest that this could further encourage the compliance
of the target government.
In the Venezuela case, the Maduro government lost any interest in negotiations with the
Guaidó team once he realized that sanctions relief was not a realistic outcome—at least while he
or any member of his winning coalition was in power. The announcement and implementation of
secondary sanctions paired with the Trump Administration’s hardline on sanctions relief left
Maduro and the Venezuelan military with little reason to work out a deal with the U.S. Perhaps a
clear plan for sanctions relief may have changed the evaluations of the regime power brokers. Such
a plan would have also benefitted the Guaidó team in the 2019 negotiations. In the Iran case, the
JPA was not exactly what this paper is recommending, but it is similar enough in spirit to
demonstrate the promise of having a plan for sanctions relief. The JPA signaled that greater
sanctions relief was a legitimate possibility—maintaining international talks would be worth it in
the end. That is the primary function of the recommended sanctions relief plan, to signal that
sanctions relief is possible and the sender is willing to help facilitate in the target’s economic
recovery. This policy recommendation is primarily suited for sanctions episodes like the two in
question where the targeted sanctions had comprehensive effects.
Implication 5: Humanitarian Concerns, Comprehensive Effects of Targeted Sanctions
This study has assessed sanctions outcomes through the narrow metric of target behavior
(compliance or non-compliance). This ignores a crucial element of targeted sanctions literature:
the humanitarian impact of sanctions. While the sanctions against both Iran and Venezuela were
targeted, the two OPEC countries’ reliance on oil ensured that intense sanctions on the energy
sector would have comprehensive effects. In both countries this led to serious humanitarian costs.
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During the Iran sanctions episode unemployment rose dramatically, families struggled to pay
tuition and school fees, and access to food became more difficult (Gordon 2013). In Venezuela,
sanctions exacerbated a preexisting economic crisis and limited the public food distribution
program, CLAP (Oliveros 2020, 47). Sanctions also made it difficult for humanitarian groups in
the country to access bank accounts (47). This raises serious ethical concerns with how senders
use targeted sanctions with widespread effects on the target’s population. When—if ever—is it
appropriate to resort to such measures? How long should these sanctions last? What should the
sender do when sanctions have clearly failed to accomplish their goal?
Those questions are all too relevant for the new Biden Administration that inherited a host
of strict sanctions regimes from the previous administration. While such policies are lambasted in
the popular press (Beinart 2021), the unfortunate reality is that targeting an adversarial state where
it is economically most vulnerable will be tempting for any administration. Therefore, the fifth
policy implication is that the U.S. should consider the use of sanctions with comprehensive effects
with the same gravity and hesitancy as it does military engagement. This view goes hand-in-hand
with the policy implications above, which focus primarily on the path to sanctions relief rather
than compliance. Placing the same importance on sanctions relief as compliance would encourage
future administrations to implement more responsible sanctions policy. For instance, this
understanding of sanctions might lead to more sincere negotiation efforts with targets or make the
U.S. more sensitive to the timespan of sanctions. Of course, there is a limit to how responsible a
maximum pressure campaign can be with regard to minimizing humanitarian costs. Given that
private benefits and public goods derived from oil revenue in the Iran and Venezuela cases, it is
no surprise that oil sanctions had severe effects on the target populations. Should future
administrations choose to employ similar measures, the most responsible approach might be to
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limit how long such sanctions are in effect and engage in diplomacy that can help to meet that
end—including compromising on the scope of policy goals.
Implications for Studying Sanctions
Beyond the aforementioned policy implications, the two case studies offer some insight into how
best to study sanctions moving forward. This paper employed three alternative explanations: the
adaptation hypothesis which focuses on target response, the evasion hypothesis which focuses on
third-party support of the target, and the enforcement and implementation hypothesis which
focuses on the sender’s policies. If anything, the two case studies reveal that these competing
hypotheses might be better described as complimentary hypotheses. To narrowly focus on one
explanation sacrifices detail for simplicity—this seems like an irresponsible tradeoff especially
when the costs of economic sanctions are so high. That being said, each of the approaches had
strengths and weaknesses that can inform how scholars study sanctions episodes.
The adaptation hypothesis seems especially useful in comparing two different sanctions
episodes. Both Iran and Venezuela are authoritarian rentier states, but sanctions led to different
outcomes. By focusing on the internal political dynamics of the target, this approach offers a
degree of nuance that allows scholars to compare cases that fall within the same regime type. While
current literature generally agrees that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the target is a
democratic state, it would be useful to look into what factors within autocratic states facilitate
sanctions success. However, this approach comes with a frustrating limitation: it is difficult to
analyze the flow of revenue and benefits within the winning coalition. For both cases in this paper,
there was not precise information on how oil wealth is allocated between public and private goods.
Perhaps the best proxy for assessing revenue flow is the degree to which third-party actors
continue to trade in sectors that face intense sanctions. The evasion hypothesis seems insufficient
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on its own due to the fact that different regimes clearly require different needs (the Venezuelan oil
industry was hurt worse than Iran’s, yet sanctions were not successful in the Venezuela case).
However, when paired with the adaptation approach, third-party support can help to explain how
target governments arrive at their decision to resist or comply with the sender’s demands. The
utility of the evasion hypothesis may also be greater in instances when sanctions fail to impose
economic costs. In both the Iran and Venezuela case, the sender was successful in harming the
target’s economy, but in cases when the sender targets less vulnerable industries as energy, thirdparty support may play a greater role in reducing economic costs to the target.
The implementation and enforcement hypothesis was extremely useful for its ability to
narrow down specific pivotal actions by the sender government. The fact that the sender was the
U.S. in both instances also made researching for this approach a bit easier. There was not at much
speculation involved in ascertaining U.S. motives compared to the other approaches. For instance,
research for the Iran case revealed conflicting argument as to why China supported Resolution
1929. The relative access to information concerning U.S. policy made it easier to analyze the
Obama and Trump Administrations use of sanctions. It seems that this approach was especially
well suited for the Venezuela case simply because the U.S. was clearly successful in imposing
economic costs, yet nothing came of it. This implies a policy failure outside of the sanctions
themselves, which the implementation and enforcement explanation can answer by analyzing
concurrent policy.
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